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A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
TARGETING AND DETENTION
Monica Hakimi*
The international law governing when states may target to kill or preventively detain nonstate actors is in disarray. This Article puts much of the
blame on the method that international law uses to answer that question.
The method establishes different standards in four regulatory domains:
(]) law enforcement, (2) emergency, (3) armed conflict for civilians, and
(4) armed conflict for combatants. Because the legal standards vary, so too
may substantive outcomes; decisionmakers must select the correct domain
before determining whether targeting or detention is lawful. This Article
argues that the "domain method" is practically unworkable and theoretically dubious. Practically, the method breeds uncertainty and subverts the
discursive process by which international law adapts to new circumstances
and holds decisionmakers accountable. Theoretically, it presupposes that
the domain choice, rather than shared substantive considerations embedded in the domains, drives legal outcomes. This Article argues, to the
contrary, that all targeting and detention law is and ought to be rooted in a
common set of core principles. Decisionmakers should look to those principles to assess when states may target or detain nonstate actors. Doing so
would address the practical problems of the domain method. It would narrow the uncertainty about when targeting and detention are lawful, lead to
a more coherent legal discourse, and equip decisionmakers to develop the
law and hold one another accountable.
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INTRODUCTION

The international law governing when states may target to kill I or preventively detain 2 nonstate actors is in disarray. Much of the blame lies with
the method that international law uses to answer that question. The method
establishes distinct standards in four regulatory domains: (1) law enforcement, (2) emergency, (3) armed conflict for civilians, and (4) armed conflict
for combatants. Because the standards vary, so too may substantive outcomes. Decisionmakers must select the correct domain before determining
whether targeting or detention is lawful.
That method-which I call the "domain method"--creates two serious
problems. One is uncertainty. 3 Many modern situations do not fit comfortably
I. Targeting involves the intentional and extrajudicial use of lethal force against specific persons or objects. Not all anticipated killings are targeted killings. A state that attacks
person X knowing that Y might die does not target Y. The legality of the attack depends on
(I) whether X was targetable, and at least in some contexts (2) whether the cost of Y's death
was proportional to the benefit of X's. This Article addresses only the first question. On the
second, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(a)(iii), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. See also infra note 18.
2. Preventive detention involves incapacitating someone who poses a threat without
any determination (by a court or prosecutor) that he has committed a crime. This definition
excludes detention on criminal charges or as criminal punishment, even if the detention serves
a preventive function. It includes detention that simultaneously serves a preventive and some
other function.
3. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,
105 AM. J. INT'L L. 201 (2011) (detention); Charles Garraway, 'To Kill or Not to Kill?'Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 499 (2009) (targeting); Marco
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in any domain, leading to intractable disputes about which one governs. For
example, legal analysts disagreed on whether the U.S. operation targeting
Osama bin Laden fell within the combatant or the law enforcement domain.
The operation was lawful under one but probably not under the other. 4
Some uncertainty reflects substantive disagreements and is inevitable,
given the decentralized nature of the international legal system. But the domain method inhibits decisionmakers from resolving uncertainties even
when they agree on substance. In several contexts, decisionmakers with
different policy perspectives have been groping toward similar "hybrids"outcomes that are more permissive than those associated with one domain
but more restrictive than those associated with another. For instance, many
decisionmakers seem to appreciate that, when targeting terrorism suspects
abroad, states have more authority than in law enforcement settings but less
than against combatants. 5 Such hybrids are not grounded in any domain, so
they cannot effectively be justified using the domain method. The method
discredits them in favor of the available but contested extremes. Separately,
the method discourages decisionmakers from agreeing on outcomes in one
case because of perceived slippery-slope implications for others. For example, the U.S. government and Human Rights Watch agree that the United
States may lawfully target certain al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen. 6 Instead of
embracing that agreement and trying to develop shared parameters for counterterrorism operations, each pushes for its preferred domain. Each seeks to
avoid the overly expansive or narrow implications of the alternative. 7
Breeding uncertainty is troubling in its own right, but it also points to a
more serious problem: the domain method stifles legal discourse. Decisionmakers now justify their preferred outcomes by invoking legal
categories that are often inapposite to the facts. Thus, instead of assessing
the bin Laden operation on the merits, analysts debated which domain governed. 8 Those who disagree on the domain talk past one another, applying
different standards to assess the same or similar conduct. That enfeebled
discourse is problematic because international law-and especially the law

Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, 90 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 599 (2010) (both).
4. See infra notes 150, 208-210 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 202-210 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Quick Thoughts on UBL's Killing-And a Response to
Lewis, 0PINI0 JURIS (May 4, 2011, 12:02 AM), http://www.opiniojuris.org/2011/05/04/quickthoughts-on-ubls-killing-and-a-response-to-lewis/; Alon Margalit, The Bin Laden Killing:
Clarifying the Normative Framework(s) Governing the 'War on Terror'?, EJIL: TALK! (Oct.
12, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-bin-laden-killing-clarifying-the-normative-frameworksgoverning-the-war-on-terror/; Marko'Milanovic, Was the Killing of Osama bin Laden La»ful?,
EJIL: TALK! (May 2, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/was-the-killing-of-osama-bin-ladenlawfuU; Marko Milanovic, When to Kill and When to Capture?, EJIL: TALK! (May 6, 2011),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/when-to-kill-and-when-to-capture/.
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on targeting and detention-functions discursively. 9 When the international
legal process works well, it provides a common language for decisionmakers to justify positions and respond to counterarguments. Decisionrnakers
here include a broad range of actors-for example, states, intergovernmental
organizations, courts, and treaty bodies-but their authority to prescribe or
apply the law, and thus the weight of their pronouncements, varies. 10 Eventually, enough decisionmakers might converge on particular outcomes and
resolve substantive uncertainties. Yet even when decisionrnakers disagree on
substance, the discursive process helps to constrain their discretion. The
more persuasively an actor defends its position, the less pressure it confronts
to alter its conduct. Conversely, the more compelling the counterarguments,
the more an actor must change its behavior or refine its position to avoid
condemnation. This discourse·is (for better or worse) the principal mechanism for developing and enforcing international law. 11 By undermining it,
the domain method frustrates targeting and detention law from adapting to
modem challenges and holding decisionmakers accountable.

9. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY
118 (1995) ("[T]he interpretation, elaboration, application, and, ultimately, enforcement of
international rules is accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange among
the interested parties."); IAN JOHNSTONE, THE POWER OF DELIBERATION 22-27 (2011)
("[l]nternational law operates largely through a process of justificatory discourse."); MALCOLM
SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (6th ed. 2008) (explaining that international law provides a "mutually understandable vocabulary book" even as it is subject to self-interested argumentation); W.
Michael Reisman, Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., International Lawmaking: A Process of
Communication, Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 24, 1981), in 75 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. IOI, 105 (1981) ("[L]awmaking
... is a process of communication."); cf JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2005) (recognizing "pervasive use of international legal rhetoric"
but dismissing its efficacy in shaping behavior).
IO.

For a more detailed description of the process, see Reisman, supra note 9.

11. Scholars disagree on the extent to which the discourse shapes behavior and on the
reasons why. Compare THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7 ( 1995) (arguing that norms "arrived at discursively in accordance with ... the right
process" may exert a "compliance pull" on states), with GoLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 9,
at 167-84 (arguing that discourse does not meaningfully shape behavior), and ANDREW T.
GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 98 (2008) (positing that discourse "increase[s] the relevance and force of reputational sanctions ... [and]
promote[s] compliance"), and Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture:
Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 644-45 (1998) (describing iterative
process of "interaction, interpretation, internalization, and obedience"), and JOHNSTONE, supra note 9, at 7 ('The justificatory discourse is consequential in that it generates pressure on
states to behave in accordance with the law .... "), and Reisman, supra note 9, at 108-20
(explaining that discourse shapes behavior by communicating that certain norms are
authoritative and controlling), and BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 357-60 (2009) (explaining that international
legal obligations may mobilize domestic actors to pressure states to comply). My argument
does not depend on any particular theory of compliance. The discourse is most of what international law does, no matter to what extent or why it shapes state behavior.
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This Article argues for retiring the domain method and replacing it with
a new functional approach. 12 It demonstrates that a set of common principles-which I label liberty-security, mitigation, and mistake-animate all
of the law on targeting and detention. Briefly, the liberty-security principle
posits that, in order for targeting or detention to be justifiable, the security
benefits must outweigh the costs to individual liberty. The mitigation principle requires states to try to lessen those costs by pursuing reasonable, less
intrusive alternatives to contain a threat. The mistake principle demands that
states exercise due diligence to reduce mistakes. Together, the functional
principles establish an overarching framework on targeting and detentionone rooted in existing law but not dependent on the domains.
Decisionmakers should use those principles rather than the domains to
specify when states may target or detain nonstate actors. Because the principles already animate the law, using them is unlikely to destabilize settled
outcomes. Where outcomes are contested, however, the functional approach
corrects the problems of the domain method. First, it empowers decisionmakers to develop the law incrementally. Decisionmakers can prescribe
an outcome for one scenario by converging on middle-ground hybrids and
without risking the slippery slope. Second, the functional approach helps to
hold decisionmakers accountable. Though substantive disputes will often
reproduce themselves in terms of liberty-security, mitigation, and mistake, 13
that change in discourse matters. Positions that are substantively indefensible become more difficult to justify and, therefore, less appealing to
advance.
The method that I propose breaks with existing legal literature on targeting and detention. Though international lawyers already question certain
aspects of the domain method, all proposals for clarification or reform either
apply that method or assume its compartmentalized structure. 14 This Article
12. The approach is "functional" in that it defines the authority to target or detain in
terms of the substantive considerations that the law is intended to serve, not by reference to
formal categories.
13. Cf Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 13, 13 (Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (arguing that "ideological struggles
... over the choice of' domain may reappear if domains change).
14. The specific proposals vary. Some argue for classifying certain cases into one or
another domain. See, e.g., Natasha Balendra, Defining Anned Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
2461 (2008) (counterterrorism measures in law enforcement domain); Michael N. Schmitt, The
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1
HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 5, 16 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance] (members of
armed groups in combatant domain). Other proposals advance new domains. See, e.g., Roy S.
Schondorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL. 1 (2004) (domain for conflicts between states and extraterritorial nonstate actors); Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443, 453
(2007) (domain for conflicts against "transnational terrorist networks typified by al-Qaeda").
Still others suggest outcomes for a particular domain or category of cases. See, e.g., INT'L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [hereinafter ICRC], INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 17-19
(2009) [hereinafter DPH STUDY] (targeting civilians); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killings of
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rejects the domain method as practically unworkable and theoretically dubious. Practically, the domain method breeds uncertainty and undermines the
discursive legal process. Theoretically, it presupposes that outcomes are determined primarily by the domain choice, rather than by shared substantive
considerations embedded in the domains. This Article argues otherwise. It
demonstrates that three core principles animate targeting and detention law
across contexts but require different outcomes depending on the facts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that, in many contexts, the
domain method is unworkable at best and corrosive to the legal process at
worst. Rather than resolve when states may target or detain people, the domain method undermines resolution. Part II presents my functional
alternative. Parts III and IV demonstrate that, compared to the domain
method, the functional approach better explains the existing law on targeting
and detention. Further, it better holds decisionmakers accountable and
equips them to develop the law.
Two brief clarifications about the scope of my argument are appropriate
before I proceed. First, this Article addresses the targeting and detention of
nonstate actors. It leaves open the question of whether to replace the domain method for state agents. 15 The domain method serves certain functions
when applied to state agents that are not replicated when applied to nonstate

Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Execution or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 171 (2005) (targeting transnational terrorism suspects). Significantly, even lawyers
who question aspects of the domain method work within it. See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. I, 2, 26 (2004) (arguing for applying multiple domains during armed conflicts but accepting that, in any particular scenario, one must trump).
15. International law already regulates targeting and detention differently when used
against state agents than when used against nonstate actors. Compare Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention Ill] (providing that the Convention applies in
full during interstate conflicts), and Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 1(3)-(4), 1125
U.N.T.S. at 7 (same), with Geneva Convention ill, supra, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75
U.N.T.S. at 136-38 (sparsely regulating conflicts against nonstate actors), and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. l, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (regulating a subset of such conflicts). Maintaining the distinction
between state and nonstate actors is an imperfect solution. First, differentiating between each
kind of actor may be difficult in practice. Nonstate actors become state agents when sufficiently controlled by the state. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, 'l[ 131 (lnt'I
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (standard of overall control); RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS (Adopted Draft 2001), reprinted
in Rep. of the Int'! Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June I, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, 'l[ 76, U.N.
Doc. N56/IO; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter DRAFT ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY] (standard of effective control). Thus, differentiating between state and
nonstate actors sometimes triggers a choice-of-law question similar to the ones that I seek to
avoid. Second, maintaining that distinction means that some nonstate actors would receive
better treatment than their state analogs-an outcome that many deem problematic. For more
on this second point, see infra note 181.
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actors. 16 Moreover, for state agents, the two methods usually produce the
same outcomes. 17 Switching methods thus may not be worth the trouble.
Second, discarding the domain method for targeting and detention does
not require discarding it for other legal questions. The method may be effective elsewhere even if not here. Although this Article asks whether to retire
the domain method on all issues, it does not answer that more sweeping
question. 18
I.

THE FAILURE OF THE DOMAIN METHOD

The domain method is a product of history. Before World War II
("WWII"), international law focused mostly on interstate relations.

Governmental abuses of nonstate actors were generally not of international
concern. 19 That sensibility shaped international humanitarian law
("IHL")-the wartime regime that was internationally codified in the nineteenth century. IHL initially regulated targeting and detention only in
interstate wars ("international conflicts"), 20 not in wars against nonstate
actors ("noninternational conflicts"). 21 IHL was designed for conflicts in
which lawful combatants-state agents licensed to fight--distinguished

16. See infra Section II.B.
17. See infra Sections ill.A, IV.A. The most significant differences are that my method
would prohibit states from targeting combatants who are known not to pose a threat or who
may reasonably be captured. For arguments supporting comparable reforms, see NILS
MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-99 (2008), and Gabriella Blum,
The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 115 (2010).
18. Persistent differences between human rights law and humanitarian law may justify
maintaining the domain method on other issues, but many of those differences are exaggerated. For example, international law directly criminalizes some conduct only during armed
conflicts. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(c)--(f), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 97-98. It indirectly criminalizes much of the same conduct at other times.
See Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341, 342 (2010)
(collecting state obligations to criminalize private conduct). Similarly, some experts claim that
only humanitarian law permits states to kill innocents as proportional "collateral" damage.
See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
240 (2000). However, human rights law sometimes permits the same. See, e.g., Ozkan v. Turkey, App. No. 21689/93, 'll'l[ 305-306 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 6, 2004) (killing innocents lawful
because proportional to the threat);Andronicou v. Cyprus, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2059, 2107
(same); Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 832 (2005) (finding that human rights law
requires state to "minimis[e][] incidental loss of civilian life").
19. See generally A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE
(2001) (providing history).
20. IHL now classifies as "international" one kind of conflict involving nonstate actors:
conflicts between states and national liberation movements. Additional Protocol I, supra note
I, art. l, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7.
21. For a more detailed history, see Sandesh Sivakumaran, Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 22 EuR. J. lNT'L L. 219, 222-24 (2011). The Lieber
Code, which the United States adopted for its (noninternational) Civil War, heavily influenced
the development of IHL. Nevertheless, IHL was codified only for international conflicts.
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themselves from civilians. 22 It regulates targeting and detention differently
for each category of person.
The post-WWII development of human rights law ("HRL") radically
"shift[ed] the fulcrum of the [international] system from the protection of
sovereigns to the protection of people." 23 HRL has always shared certain
precepts with IHL; both seek to protect human dignity. 24 But the two regimes developed independently and for distinct contexts. 25 HRL was meant
to regulate not interstate wars but everyday relations between a government
and its people. By default, its norms have been crafted for domestic law enforcement settings. More lenient norms may apply during national
emergencies.
Although HRL has developed mostly for law enforcement settings, its
fundamental promise-that everyone be protected from undue intrusionsresonates more broadly. That promise butts up against the compartmentalized
prescriptions on targeting and detention. As discussed, international law regulates targeting and detention differently in (1) wartime settings involving
lawful combatants, (2) wartime settings involving civilians, (3) law enforcement settings, and (4) national emergencies. 26 The outcomes associated with
each domain were designed for its particular setting-though, as we shall see,
outcomes in some domains remain underdeveloped. 27 The predicament is that,
because of its splintered origins, the international law on targeting and detention specifies outcomes for only some contexts. Modem sensibilities demand
that it regulate all contexts.

22. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annex arts. 1-2,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295-96 [hereinafter Hague IV]. IHL grants combatant status to
a small subset of nonstate actors. Id. (nonstate actors participating in levee en masse); Additional Protocol I, supra note I, arts. I, 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 23-24 (nonstate actors
participating in national liberation movements). Such nonstate combatants are rare in practice;
I do not resolve whether they should be treated like other nonstate actors (and included in my
study) or like other lawful combatants (and excluded).
23. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866,872 (1990).
24. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 'll 183 (Int'! Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. I 0, 1998) ("The general principle of respect for human
dignity is ... the very raison d'etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law.").
25. See JEAN P!CTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15
(1975); Meron, supra note 18, at 240.
26. The IHL domains also apply during occupations. See Geneva Convention III, supra
note 15, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136. Some literature posits that other domains
do or should exist. See, e.g., William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 741 (2005)
(armed conflict domain governed by HRL); Sloane, supra note 14, at 484-85 (domain for
conflicts against networks like al-Qaeda); Kenneth Anderson, Predators over Pakistan, WKLY.
STANDARD, Mar. 8, 2010, at 20, 26 (domain for use-of-force operations taken in self-defense).
Those domains are not now in the mainstream, but to the extent they exist, identifying the
applicable domain is all the more complicated.
27. See, e.g., infra Section I.B.3 (emergency generally); infra Section III.B. l (civilian
targeting); infra Section IV.A (civilian and emergency detention).
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The longstanding method for updating that law has been the domain
method. The method's basic premise is that the domains operate independently and sometimes incompatibly. 28 After all, the law on targeting and
detention is compartmentalized, and outcomes across domains typically do
vary. The domain choice presumably determines the outcome. Building on
that premise, the method makes four moves. First, decisionmakers must
identify the correct domain before assessing state conduct. Second, decisionmakers should fill regulatory gaps by expanding an existing domain's
scope of application. 29 Third, extending a domain means requiring in the
new context the outcome that was designed for its original context. Fourth,
to the extent a domain is underdeveloped, its outcomes must be derived internally. No overarching framework exists for developing the law within
domains. 30
That method is embedded in the international legal doctrine, which presents a dizzying set of questions for identifying the applicable domain: Does
an armed conflict exist? If so, does the IHL domain for combatants or civilians apply? Does the relevant IHL domain trump HRL? Does HRL even
apply when the state acts extraterritorially? If HRL applies, does its law enforcement or emergency domain apply? Though the domain method
requires answering those questions before assessing state conduct, it lacks
effective tools for determining the correct answers. Inevitably, it leads to
disputes about which domain govems---disputes that, because the system is
decentralized, no actor has unilateral authority to resolve. To be clear, my
argument is not that the applicable domain is always indeterminate or contested. My argument is that the domain method does little, if any, work to
identify that domain; the method neither guides nor constrains decisionmakers. Instead, it undermines the discursive process by which the law might
adapt to new challenges or hold decisionmakers accountable.

28. See, e.g., ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 19, ICRC Doc. 31IC/! 1/5. l.2 (Oct. 2011) ("[T]he logic and criteria
governing the use of lethal force under IHL and [HRL] do not coincide ...."); Marko Milanovic, A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship Between International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 459, 466 (2009) ("[A] norm
conflict will not only be unavoidable, but also unresolvable."); Nancie Prud'homrne, Lex Spe·
cialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?, 40 lsR. L. REv. 356,
361 (2007) (asserting that the domains are "often paradoxical and at odds with" one another).
29. See infra Section LB. I (on extending to noninternational conflicts IHL for
international conflicts); infra Section I.B.2 (on extending to noninternational conflicts law
enforcement HRL); infra Section I.B.3 (on applying law enforcement HRL extraterritorially).
30. International lawyers have begun to question the second and third of those moves.
See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 14 (proposing hybrid); Sloane, supra note 14 (proposing new
domain); infra notes 115-118 and accompanying text (modifying a domain's ordinary outcomes). Nevertheless, the domain method overwhelmingly dominates the literature and
practice. For a recent overview of the method and evidence of its problems, see ANDREA
BIANCHI & YASMIN NAQVI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM 374-89
(2011).
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A. Armed Conflict?

The domain method's starting point is the armed conflict test. 31 An
armed conflict triggers IHL, which historically displaced HRL. 32 Now, IHL
and HRL may apply concurrently during armed conflicts,33 but states presumably have more authority to target and detain if both regimes apply than
if only HRL applies. 34
The test for identifying nonintemational armed conflicts is notoriously
deficient. 35 Most decisionmakers consider three factors: (1) the participants'
levels of organization; (2) their ambitions and perceptions of the situation;
and (3) the scale, duration, and intensity of their violence. 36 However, nonstate actors commit violence all the time; their organizational structures,
intentions, and levels of violence vary widely. 37 Though some situations
31. See, e.g., RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
LAW 7 (2002); Kenneth Watkin, Humanitarian Law and 21st-Century Conflict: Three Block
Wars, Terrorism, and Complex Security Situations, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW I, 42 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
32. See Heike Krieger, A Conflict of Norms: The Relationship Between Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law in the JCRC Customary Law Study, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY
L. 265, 266 (2006) ("For several decades, it was generally considered that human rights law is
not applicable in situations of armed conflict.").
33. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Case),
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 'll 25 (July 8); Michael J. Dennis, Non-Application of Civil
and Political Rights Treaties Extraterritorially During Times of International Armed Conflict,
40 lsR. L. REv. 453,455 (2007) (''The majority of states ... appear to accept the view that the
provisions of the international human rights treaties may continue to apply domestically during an internal armed conflict."); Meron, supra note 18, at 267-73 (reviewing practice).
34. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror: Washington's Abuse
of "Enemy Combatants", 83 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 2-3 (2004) ("The rules that bind governments
are much looser during wartime than in times of peace.").
35. See LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 32 (2002) (''There
is, as yet, no universally accepted definition ...."); Kretzrner, supra note 14, at 195 ("The
scope and level of violence required ... has never been clearly defined."); Jakob Kellenberger,
President, ICRC, Sixty Years of the Geneva Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better
Face the Future, Address at the Ceremony to Celebrate the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva
Conventions (Aug. 12, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/genevaconventions-statement-president-120809.htrn ("[T}here is no clear, universally-accepted legal
definition of what [a noninternational] conflict actually is.").
36. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-94-4-T, Judgement, 'l[ 625 (Sept. 2,
1998) (explaining that violence must meet certain level of intensity); Prosecutor v. Tactic, Case
No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 'll 70
(Int'! Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is ... protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups."); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE l\vo 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
1949, at 628 n.9 (1982) (explaining that Additional Protocol II excludes riots "not directed by
a leader and hav[ing] no concerted intent" but includes "military operations carried out by
armed forces or organized armed groups").
37. See Jennifer M. Hazen, Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups, 92 INT'L REv.
RED CROSS 369 (2010) (examining variation); Kenneth Watkin, Opponunity Last: Organized
Armed Groups and the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42

HeinOnline -- 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1374 2011-2012

June 2012)

Targeting and Detention

1375

clearly pass or fail the armed conflict test, many fall somewhere in between;
or at least, their proper classification is not evident from those three factors.
Consider the U.S. fight against al-Qaeda. The United States claims to be
engaged in a global armed conflict-one without inherent geographic limits
and fought wherever al-Qaeda members are located. 38 That claim is plausible under the armed conflict test. 39 Al-Qaeda has a centralized leadership
(factor 1), each side understands itself to be at war (factor 2), and highintensity violence between the two sides continues (factor 3). The armed
conflict test also supports a narrower construction: that any conflict exists
only in hot zones of combat. 40 The three factors do not resolve which claim
is correct-whether IHL governs worldwide or only on hot battlefields. The
factors are similarly ineffective in other contexts. For example, drug cartels
in Mexico and Brazil are well organized (factor 1), undermine the state
security apparatus (factor 2), and commit large-scale, horrific violence
(factor 3).41 But most states42 and international lawyers43 resist classifying
N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L. & PoL. 641, 674 (2010) [hereinafter Watkin, Direct Participation]
("Groups fighting State authorities include a diverse range of organizations that reflect the
broad scope of potential insurgent activity.").
38. See John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec'y of State, Legal Issues in
the War on Terrorism, Speech at the London School of Economics (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter
Bellinger, LSE Speech], transcribed as Development, 8 GER. L.J. 735, 739 (2007); Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and International
Law, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Koh, ASIL Speech], http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/
remarks/139119.htm.
39. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Who May be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in
the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 37-41
(2010) [hereinafter Chesney, Who May be Killed?]; Derek Jinks, September 11 and the Laws
of War, 28 YALE J. lNT'L L. 1, 9 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Declaration of Prof. Mary Ellen O'Connell at 7, AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, No.
10-cv-01469 (JOB) (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2010); Balendra, supra note 14. Even if one limits IHL to
hot battlefields, the parameters of the battlefield may be undefined. See Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the
Parameters of the 'Zone of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. I (2010).
41. On Mexico, see generally COLLEEN W. CooK, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL 34215,
MEXICO'S DRUG CARTELS (2007); Sara A. Carter, 100,000 Foot Soldiers in Cartels: Numbers
Rival Mexican Army, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at Al; and Alfredo Corchado, Drug Cartels
Taking Over Government Roles in Parts of Mexico, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 2, 2011,
2011 WLNR 8659328. On Brazil, see generally Jon Lee Anderson, Gangland: Who Controls
the Streets of Rio de Janeiro?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 5, 2009, at 46. On both, see generally Mu
G. MANWARING, A CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY: GANGS AND OTHER ILLICIT TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, EL SALVADO.R,
MEXICO, JAMAICA, AND BRAZIL (2007), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.
army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?publD=837.
42. States often deny a conflict to downplay the seriousness of the situation and try to
limit insurgents' access to international actors. See OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA Nf AoLA.IN,
LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 360 (2006).
43. See, e.g., Patrick Gallahue, Mexico's "War on Drugs"-Real or Rhetorical Armed
Conflict?, 24 J. INT'L L. PEACE & ARMED CONFLICT 39 (2011) (arguing against armed conflict classification); Pierre Hauck & Sven Peterke, Organized Crime and Gang Violence in
National and International Law, 92 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 407 (2010) (arguing that organized
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such situations as armed conflicts. Conflicts trigger IHL and, presumably,
wartime authority.
In some contexts, the armed conflict test not only fails to resolve whether a conflict exists but also inhibits decisionmakers from manifesting their
substantive agreement. In late 2010, Human Rights Watch sent President
Obama an open letter questioning U.S. targeting operations in places like
Yemen. 44 The letter rejected the U.S. claim of a global armed conflict and
asserted that the United States may target people either under IHL "on a
genuine battlefield, or [under HRL] in a law enforcement action."45 It gave
the impression that, outside of hot battlefields, Human Rights Watch and the
United States fundamentally disagreed about the scope of U.S. targeting
authority. 46 After all, HRL is typically less permissive than IHL. Yet Human
Rights Watch later conceded that U.S. operations in Yemen might be lawful,
even if they would be unlawful in an ordinary law enforcement setting. 47 It
clarified that, "in the places we are talking about," the choice of domain
might be immaterial. 48
Instead of refining that agreement and trying to specify the parameters
for U.S. counterterrorism operations, each side pushes for its preferred domain. Each worries about a different slippery slope. In the fight against
terrorism, the armed conflict test treats all settings that are not hot battlefields the same. Human Rights Watch resists applying IHL in Yemen
because doing so suggests that IHL applies worldwide. Meanwhile, the
United States invokes IHL even though it does not intend to exercise full
IHL authority worldwide. 49 The domain method denies the United States
gang violence should rarely pass armed conflict test); Roth, supra note 34, at 3 ("[O]rganized
crime or drug trafficking, although methodical and bloody, are generally understood to fall
under law enforcement rules ...."). But see Carina Bergal, Note, The Mexican Drug War: The
Case for a Non-International Armed Conflict Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1042
(2011).
44. Letter from Kenneth Roth, President, Human Rights Watch, to President Barack
Obama (Dec. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Roth Letter], available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
2010/12/07/letter-obama-targeted-killings.
45. Id. at 2.
46. See id.; see also Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Exec. Dir., Am. Civil Liberties
Union, to President Barack Obama 1 (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/2010-4-28-ACLULettertoPresidentObama.pdf (contesting targeting in Yemen
because "[t]he entire world is not a war zone"); Roth, supra note 34, at 4 (protesting "dangerous ... implications" of wartime model).
47. See Robert Chesney, Malinowski on IHL Away from the Battlefield and on the
Meaning of Imminence, LAWFARE (Dec. 14, 2010, 3:01 PM) [hereinafter Malinowski Comment], www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/malinowski-on-ihl-away-from-the-battlefield-and-onthe-meaning-of-imminence/ (quoting Tom Malinowski).
48. Id.
49. See Bellinger, LSE Speech, supra note 38, at 739 ("I am not suggesting that ... the
United States is free to use military force against al Qaida in any state where an al Qaida terrorist may seek shelter."); John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, Speech at
the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security (Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Brennan
Speech], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 l/09/16/remarks-john-o-
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any basis for asserting more than its law enforcement authority in some
nonbattlefield settings.so The two sides debate whether IHL or HRL governs,
instead of developing the substantive law.
B. What Follows?
Even assuming an armed conflict, the correct domain will be unclear.
Recall that, historically, IHL did not regulate targeting and detention in noninternational conflicts.s 1 IHL treaties have since been updated, but in most
noninternational conflicts, they still provide only sparse protections from
targeting and detention.s 2 States refuse to afford insurgents combatant status
because that status confers the license to fight.s 3 Nevertheless, most states
appreciate that minimally regulating noninternational conflicts is no longer
tenable.s 4 Two visions exist for filling the gaps. One applies by analogy
(and mostly as a matter of custom) IHL for international conflicts.ss The

brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an (explaining preference for exercising more limited authority when feasible).
50. The United States recently suggested that the jus ad helium limits when it may use
military force against al-Qaeda suspects abroad. See Brennan Speech, supra note 49. Professor
Anderson has likewise suggested that the jus ad helium-not IHL or HRL-governs certain
counterterrorism operations. See Anderson, supra note 26. However, the majority position is
that the jus ad helium, which focuses on protecting state sovereignty, does not displace IHL or
HRL, which focuses on protecting individuals. See DRAFT ARTICLES ON .STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 15, at 74; Geoffrey S. Corn, Self-Defense Targeting: Conflict Classification
or Willful Blindness? (Oct. 22, 2011) (working paper), available at http://
ssrn.corn/abstract= 1947838.
51. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
52. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 15, arts. 1, 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. 611,615 (immunizing civilians in some noninternational conflicts); Geneva Convention III, supra note 15,
art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38 (protecting people who are wounded, sick,
or "taking no active part in the hostilities").
53. Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 197 ("States were, and still are, unwilling to grant the
status of combatants to insurgents and other non-state actors ...."); cf Additional Protocol I,
supra note 1, arts. 2, 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7-8, 23-24 (extending combatant protections
only to members of nonstate groups who are fighting for national liberation).
54. See generally ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW XXXV
(Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIL STUDY] (collecting state practice and opinio juris on the "expanded . . . rules applicable to noninternational armed conflicts"); see also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on
the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 'lI 97 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) ("Why ... refrain from enacting the same bans or providing
the same protection when armed violence has erupted 'only' within the territory of a sovereign
State?").
55. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law:
A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87
lNT'L REV. RED CRoss 175, 189 (2005) ("The gaps ... have ... largely been filled through
State practice, which has led to the creation of rules parallel to those [applicable in
international conflicts], but applicable as customary law to non-international armed conflicts."). Additional Protocol II, supra note 15, also extends IHL for international conflicts,
making minor adjustments for the noninternational element. See Sivakumaran, supra note 21,
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second applies HRL. Each vision finds support in the international practice,
but neither offers coherent criteria for identifying the applicable domain.
1. Quasi-Combatant or Civilian?

Regulating noninternational conflicts by analogy to international conflicts makes some intuitive sense; it might save decisionmakers from
recreating the wheel. But the analogy is deeply imperfect. In international
conflicts, IHL establishes different domains for lawful combatants and civilians. Lawful combatants are, with rare exception, members of state armed
forces who must and generally do wear uniforms or other identifying insignia. 56 States may not prosecute combatants for participating in hostilities
and must afford them prisoner-of-war ("POW") status when captured. In
exchange, combatants are targetable, unless they are hors de combat (i.e.,
surrendered, detained, sick, or wounded), 57 and they are detainable without
legal process. 58 All noncombatants are civilians. 59 Civilians generally are
immune from targeting and detention. 60 They lose their targeting immunity
when they directly participate in hostilities and their detention immunity
when they pose an imperative security threat. 61 Yet that loss of immunity is
the exception, not the norm.
The combatant-civilian distinction translates awkwardly for noninternational conflicts, because insurgents do not fit neatly into either domain. 62
They receive none of the benefits of combatant status. 63 Moreover, they often blend in with the general population; treating them as combatants

at 227 (explaining that Additional Protocol II "took as its starting point the law of international
armed conflict").
56. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at
138-40; Additional Protocol I, supra note I, arts. 43-44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23-24. On the
exceptions, see Geneva Convention Ill, supra note 15, art. 4(A)(6), 6 U.S.T. at 3322, 75
U.N.T.S. at 140, and Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7.
57. CIL STUDY, supra note 54, at 3 ("Attacks may only be directed against combatants
.... This rule has to be read in conjunction with the prohibition to attack persons recognised
to be hors de combat ....").
58. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, arts. 21, 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-36, 3406, 75
U.N.T.S. at 152-54, 224.
59. Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
60. Id. art. 52(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27 (targeting); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 34, 42, 78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
3540, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 310 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (detention).
61. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, arts. 42, 78, 6 U.S.T. at 3566--67, 75
U.N.T.S. at 336-37 (detention); Additional Protocol I, note 1, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 2627 (targeting).
62. Henckaerts, supra note 55, at 190 ("[I]n non-international armed conflicts practice
is ambiguous as to whether ... members of armed opposition groups are considered members
of armed forces or civilians.").
63. MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? 208
( 1999) ("[nhe law of non-international armed conflicts ... foresees no combatant status [and]
does not define combatants ....").
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exacerbates the risk that states will target or detain innocents by rnistake. 64
However, most insurgents are also unlike civilians. Under the armed conflict
paradigm, they comprise a party to the conflict, not part of the protected
population. And because they are not licensed to fight, they presumably
should receive no more protections than lawful combatants do. 65
Decisionmakers therefore disagree on whether to classify insurgents as
civilians or "quasi-combatants"-i.e., people who are targetable and detainable like lawful combatants without the benefits of combatant status. 66 The
latter position dorninates. 67 Still, no shared criteria define quasi-combatants
or, therefore, delineate when the combatant domain applies. Some decisionmakers and IHL experts use a broad membership rule like the one for
lawful combatants: anyone who belongs to the armed nonstate group is a
quasi-combatant. 68 Canadian Brigadier General Kenneth Watkin defends
that rule on the ground that nonstate groups are sometimes "organized, and

64. See, e.g., Oma Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, 'We Must Not Make a Scarecrow
of the Law': A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL lNT'L
L.J. 233, 269 (2003) ("This militarization of the civilian population is, indeed, a characteristic
feature of non-international conflicts ... tender[ing] it ever harder to distinguish between
civilians and combatants."); Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Watfare, I HARV. NAT'L SECURITY J. 45,
53 (2010) (observing that "[n]ew warfare" is "characterized by fighting in highly populated
areas with a blurring of the lines between military forces and civilian persons and objects").·
65. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Editorial Comment, The Detention of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, 103 AM. J. lNT'L L. 48, 56 (2009) ("[l]fthe law permits states to subject lawful combatants to measure Y, the law a fortiori permits states to subject unlawful combatants to that
same measure.").
66. International lawyers use different terms for this category of person-for example,
unlawful combatants, unprivileged belligerents, insurgents, and people who directly participate in hostilities. See Blank & Guiora, supra note 64, at 64 & n.54, 65. Moreover, the term
"quasi-combatant" has been used differently than I define it in the text. See J.M. Spaight, NonCombatants and Air Attack, 9 AIR L. REV. 372, 375 (1938) (labeling as "quasi-combatants"
armament workers who are "civilians and at the same time engaged in activities as harmful to
an enemy as those of the armed forces").
67. See, e.g., ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1453 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS]; DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 22;
Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 64, at 271; Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14,
at 16. But see, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing
Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 490-95 (Isr.) (classifying as civilians); Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Addendum: Study on Targeted Killings, 'l[ 58,
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston)
[hereinafter Alston, Study on Targeted Killings] (same); Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the
Laws of War in the "War on Terrorism", 22 LAW & INEQUALITY 195, 207-08 (2004) (reviewing support for minority position).
68. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 'l[ 177 (lnt'I Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000); Brief for Appellees at 18, Al-Bihani v. Obama,
No. 09-5051 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2010); COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note
67, at 1453; Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, at 35; Watkin, Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 675-78.
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in a number of ways act like regular armed forces." 69 The International
Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") defines quasi-combatants more narrowly, to include only people who continuously and directly participate in
the hostilities on behalf of the group. 70 Each definition presents a different
domain problem. Watkin's definition is too permissive when applied to
loosely organized groups; the combatant domain would apply to people
who, though belonging to the group, are more like civilians. 71 The ICRC
definition is too restrictive when applied to tight-knit groups; the civilian
domain would apply to people who, though not continuously fighting, are
more like combatants. 72 The domain method does not identify which domain
problem to tolerate.
Meanwhile, the imperative to define quasi-combatants for all noninternational conflicts obscures areas of agreement. Each side of the debate
advocates for its definition to avoid the alternative's slippery slope-the toopermissive or too-restrictive application. Yet the two sides agree on quite a
bit. Whatever their formulations may suggest, advocates of the broad membership rule typically acknowledge that people who marginally associate
with the group or participate only in a nonmilitary faction should be excluded.73 Their disagreement with the ICRC seems to boil down to this: may
states presumptively target and detain people who are integrated into the
armed faction but do not regularly and directly participate in hostilities?
That question is considerably narrower than how to define quasicombatants for all noninternational conflicts. The civilian-combatant
frame distracts decisionmakers from identifying and refining their agreement and circumscribing their disagreement. 74
69. Watkin, Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 678.
70. DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 33; see also Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life
in Armed Conflict: Does International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 lNT'L
REv. RED CROSS 881, 891 (2006) (" '[A]rmed groups' are narrowly defined to include only
those members who regularly do the actual fighting.").
71. See DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 33 ("[T]here may be various degrees of affiliation with such groups that do not necessarily amount to 'membership' within the meaning of
IHL."); Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV.
NAT'L SECURITY J. 145, 158 (2010) ("A mere membership test in the case of Hamas or some
other Palestinian organizations would have been especially prone to over-inclusive application, as alongside their military wings, these organizations also have broad political, social,
economic, and cultural operations.").
72. See, e.g., Watkin, Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 678.
73. For example, Watkin defines quasi-combatants as people who belong to "armed
forces ... under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates." Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 691. Belonging to a group's armed forces suggests participation in its
military faction. Operating under its command structure suggests more than a marginal association. See also Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, at 22 ("Within mixed groups,
membership in the armed faction is often clear-cut ....").
74. The frame probably also undermines efforts to specify the law for civilians. Decisionmakers will not resolve when civilians are targetable unless they know who qualifies as a
civilian. And the broader the civilian domain, the more decisionmakers dispute its content. An
outcome that works for one civilian is too permissive or restrictive for another. For example,
the Israeli Supreme Court has classified as civilians everyone (including terrorists) in the Pal-
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2. Humanitarian or Human Rights Law?
No matter which IHL domain is more relevant, decisionmakers must determine how it interacts with HRL. 75 Applying IHL and HRL concurrently is
straightforward when they lead to comparable outcomes. 76 But on targeting
and detention, IHL is understood to be more permissive.
The dominant theory for addressing that tension posits that the more
specific norm-the lex specialis-trumps. 77 The theory does not resolve
when a norm is the lex specialis. 78 Decisionmakers widely accept that IHL
provides the lex specialis on targeting and detention during international
conflicts, because IHL was specifically crafted for interstate wars.79 However, neither regime is directly on point during noninternational conflicts. 80
Nonstate fighters are unlike enemy states in that they lack the legal or practical benefits of statehood. The relationship between a state and individuals
is the central focus not of IHL but of HRL. Yet ordinary HRL is tailored to
estinian territories. Having defined the domain broadly, it rejected the revolving door as too
restrictive. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in lsr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing Case)
2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 490-95, 496-501 (lsr.). Commentators object that, whatever its
difficulties for civilian-terrorists, the door is critical for other civilians. See Kristen E.
Eichensehr, Comment, On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted
Killings, 116 YALE LJ. 1873 (2007). For more on this debate, see infra Section III.B.l.
75. At this level of generality, the international practice is incoherent. See, e.g., Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While
Countering Terrorism, Report of the Independent Expert on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, <JI 29, transmitted by Note of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103 (Feb. 7, 2005) (by Robert
K. Goldman) ("Human rights treaty bodies have no common approach ...."); Sassoli & Olson, supra note 3, at 603 ("In confrontations with rebel groups, some states let human rights
prevail, some apply by analogy the rules of humanitarian law governing international armed
conflicts and some a mix of the two.").
76. In this event, each regime may complement or inform the other. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/l-T, Judgement, <J[<J[ 465-497 (Int'! Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (using HRL norms on mistreatment to specify
IHL).
77. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Israeli Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.CJ. 136, <JI 106 (July 9); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Case), Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, <JI 25 (July 8). A few scholars reject the lex specialis theory and argue for applying
the more protective regime, which usually means HRL. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Toward a
Human Rights Approach to Armed Conflict: Iraq 2003, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y
171, 225-28 (2004); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interaction Between Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law: A Case of Fragmentation?, N.Y.U. INT'L L. & JUST. COLLOQUIUM, 39
(Feb. 26, 2007), http://iilj.org/courses/documents/Orakhelashvili.pdf.
78. For a more extensive discussion, see Prud'homme, supra note 28, at 381-86.
79. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons Case, 1996 I.CJ. 226, <JI 25; Coard v. United States,
Case 10.951, 'I[ 42, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.LN/II.106, doc. 6
rev. (1999); Human Rights Comm., Fourth Periodic Report: United States <J[<J[ 506-07 (Dec. 30,
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/l7978 l.htm#artl.
80. See Abresch, supra note 26; Claus KreB, Some Reflections on the International
Legal Framework Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L.
245, 261-64 (2010).
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law enforcement settings, instead of war. The lex specialis theory tees up but
does not answer the domain question.
Worse yet, the theory reinforces the domain method's mandate to select
among the available domains. Lex specialis posits that either IHL or HRL
must trump. Decisionmakers sometimes disagree on those options even
when they appear to agree on some hybrid. 81 Hybrids are not well grounded
in any domain because they deviate from the ordinary outcomes in each.
The domain method and its lex specialis theory discredit the hybrids in favor
of the available but more contested extremes.
3. Law Enforcement, Emergency, or Neither?
Absent an armed conflict, IHL does not apply, so its relationship with
HRL is not at issue. Decisionmakers must look only to HRL, which usually
means the law enforcement domain. However, HRL limits that domain in
two respects.
First, HRL permits states to derogate from certain obligations, including
on targeting and detention, during national emergencies. 82 The emergency
test is, like the armed conflict one, deeply deficient. 83 Distinguishing emergencies from either low-level conflicts or periods of normalcy has proven
untenable in practice. 84 Human rights organs sometimes assert that emergencies must be "exceptional and temporary." 85 Yet those organs usually
defer to states on whether an emergency exists. 86 Several states have claimed
81.

See infra Sections III.B, IV.B.2.

82. American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
152 [hereinafter IACHR] (derogation on detention); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 [hereinafter ICCPR] (same);
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232-34 [hereinafter ECHR] (derogation on detention and targeting).
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has no derogation clause but probably
achieves analogous results by permitting states to limit rights for "collective security." African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 27(2), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 251
[hereinafter ACHPR].
83. See LoUISE DosWELD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN nMEs OF CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 86-89 (2011) (reviewing jurisprudence of human rights bodies and concluding same).
84.

GROSS & Nf AOLAIN, supra note 42, at 265-304, 346-49.

85. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 'lI 2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.l I (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment 29]; see
also The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 72 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.) (noting that
public emergencies must be "actual or imminent" and "exceptional"); Special Rapporteur
Appointed Pursuant to Economic and Social Council Resolution 1985/37, The Administration

of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency: Tenth Annual Repon and List of States Which, Since I January 1985, Have
Proclaimed, Extended or Terminated a State of Emergency, 'lI'Il 49-101, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 (June 23, 1997) (asserting that emergencies must address an "exceptional threat" and be time limited). But see A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 49 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 625, 709 (2009) (rejecting any temporal limit).
86. GROSS & Ni AoLAIN, supra note 42, at 265-304, 346-49. But see, e.g., Human
Rights Comm., Consideration of Repons Submitted by States Panies Under Anicle 40 of the
Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 'l[ 7, U.N. Doc.
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what Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ni Aolain call "permanent emergencies"situations characterized by persistent but low levels of violence. 87
Decisionmakers disagree on the scope of application of the emergency
domain in part because it appears to afford states more authority to intrude
on individual liberties. States use the domain to claim expansive authority. 88
Human rights organs resist the domain 89 because they worry that it affords
states too much authority. 90 In fact, applying the emergency domain rarely
alters the nature of a state's obligations. States may need more authority to
target or detain during emergencies than in law enforcement settings, but
both domains permit states more authority if-and only if-that authority is
necessary. 91 Because both domains use a necessity standard, the domain
choice matters much less than is ordinarily presumed.92 If anything, having
an emergency domain breeds confusion and invites debate.
HRL's second limitation is geographic. Though HRL has developed for
domestic law enforcement settings, decisionmakers increasingly apply it
extraterritorially. The extent to which it applies extraterritorially is
contested. At one extreme, the United States has suggested that HRL never
applies outside a state's national territory. 93 At the other, some actors assert
that HRL regulates all extraterritorial conduct just as it regulates a state's
CCPR/C/ISR/C0/3 (Sept. 3, 2010) [hereinafter HRC Israel Observations] (expressing skepticism on longstanding emergency).
87. GROSS & NfAOLAIN, supra note 42, at 171, 342-45.
88. See, e.g., Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Administration of Justice,
Rule of Law and Democracy: Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency: List of
States Which Have Proclaimed or Continued a State of Emergency: Rep. of the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights Submitted in Accordance with Commission of Human
Rights Decision /998//08, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/6 (July 7, 2005) [hereinafter
OHCHR Report on States of Emergency] (listing declarations of emergency).
89. See, e.g., General Comment 29, supra note 85.
90. See Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, in letter dated Jan. 5, 1995
from the Permanent Representative of Norway and the Charge d' Affaires of the Permanent
Mission of Finland addressed to the Commission on Human Rights, at 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/116 (Jan. 31, 1995) ("Noting that international law relating to human rights and
humanitarian law ... does not adequately protect human beings in situations of ... emergency
...."); see also THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 136 (1987) (explaining that, in emergencies short of armed conflicts,
derogating "results in a denial of elementary protections").
91. See infra notes 115, 133, 229-236 and accompanying text.
92. For a similar argument, see Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40
lsR. L. REv. 310, 320 (2007).
93. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under
Article 40 of the Covenant: Third Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2003: United
States of America, 'l[ 130, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005); cf Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Information Received from
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Implementation of the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee (CCPR/C/GBR/C0/6), 'l[ 24, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GBR/C0/6/Add.l (Nov. 3, 2009) ("[T]he Covenant could only have effect outside
the territory of the UK in very exceptional circumstances.").
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internal conduct: "[A] State party [may not] perpetrate violations ... on the
territory of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own
territory." 94 Most of the practice falls somewhere in between, applying HRL
extraterritorially on the basis of state control. The more control a state has,
the greater the likelihood that HRL govems. 95
The literature overwhelmingly assumes that, when regulating a state's
extraterritorial intrusions, HRL requires what it would domestically; law
enforcement HRL either governs or does not. 96 Both options may be inapt.
The norms that govern internally will sometimes be too restrictive when
applied extraterritorially. States acting extraterritorially typically lack the
tools and institutions that, back home, enable them to respect human rights
while satisfying other legitimate interests. As Christian Tomuschat explained
while serving on the United Nations ("UN") Human Rights Committee,
HRL's territorial limitations accommodate "objective difficulties which
might impede the implementation of [HRL] in specific situations."97 At the
same time, not applying HRL might permit states to escape international
94. Saldfas de L6pez v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 52/1979, 'Jl 12.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979 (Human Rights Comm. July 29, 1981), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL (SECOND TO SIXTEENTH
SESSIONS), at 88, 91, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, U.N. Sales No. E.84.XIV.2 (1985) [hereinafter
I HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. DECISIONS]; see also Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 567, 588 (2004) (same); Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 56/1979,
'l! 10.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (Human Rights Comm. July 29, 1981), reprinted in
I HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. DECISIONS, supra, at 92, 94 (same).
95. HRL probably applies when a state controls foreign territory. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 'l! 216
(Dec. 19); Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 352, 355-56. It also may apply
when a state has physical custody over someone. See, e.g., AI-Saadoon v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 61498/08, 51 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212 (2010); Human Rights Comm., General Comment
No. 31 [80]: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant, 'l! 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). The practice is more
conflicted on what other forms of extraterritorial control trigger HRL. See Droege, supra note
92, at 325-330 (summarizing practice).
96. See, e.g., Bankovii:, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 353 (asking about "the scope and
reach of the entire Convention system of human rights protection"); Celiberti de Casariego, at
'I[ 10.3; NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS 205
(2010). Some of the practice under HRL distinguishes obligations of result from obligations
of conduct. Obligations not to kill or detain arbitrarily are considered obligations of result.
States violate these obligations by failing to achieve the specified results-i.e., by killing or
detaining arbitrarily. Such obligations presumably require the same result everywhere. In
contrast, obligations of conduct require states to take measures toward some end, without
necessarily achieving that end. For example, a state might have to take measures to protect
someone from third-party harm without guaranteeing her protection. The requisite measures for
satisfying obligations of conduct typically depend on the circumstances, so those taken
extraterritorially might differ from those required domestically. Compare, e.g., Al-Jedda v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789, 843-48 (2011) (applying obligation not to
detain as it applies domestically), with, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07,
'll'l! 164--167 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7, 2011) (underscoring that, because the obligation to investigate
is an obligation of conduct, requisite measures depend on extraterritorial circumstances).
97.
ring).

Celiberti de Casariego, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 (Tomuschat, concur-
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regulation altogether. "Never," Tomuschat said, "was it envisaged ... to
grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to carry out wilful and
deliberate attacks against ... [people] living abroad." 98 Hybrid outcomes
that accommodate the extraterritorial element without letting states completely off the hook would better balance the interests for and against
extraterritorial regulation, making resolution more likely. 99 But such outcomes are unavailable using the domain method. Instead, the domain
method focuses decisionmakers on the two extremes: apply law enforcement HRL as is or do not apply it at all.

***
The domain method requires selecting a domain before assessing state
conduct, but it does not meaningfully guide domain decisions or resolve
domain disputes. The correct domain is often ambiguous. Worse yet, focusing on the domain question undermines substantive resolution. Agreeing in
one case might risk slippery-slope implications for other cases. Or it might
require a hybrid that is inaccessible using the domains.

II. PRECURSOR TO FUNCTIONALISM
A. The Theoretical Shift
The domain method is not only unworkable in practice but also dubious
in theory. As I demonstrate below, the method's basic premise-that the
domains operate independently and sometimes incompatibly-is mistaken.
Rather, the same core principles animate targeting and detention law in all
domains. Those principles are straightforward, 100 but they explain settled
outcomes better than the domains do. They account for the variance within
each domain and the consistencies across domains. Indeed, the principles
capture areas of substantive agreement, even when the domain or outcome is
contested.
The liberty-security principle identifies the outer bounds of permissible
state action. The security benefits of targeting or detaining someone must be
proportional to or outweigh the costs to individual liberty. IHL and HRL both
seek to protect people from state harm, but both balance that individual liberty
interest against an interest in preserving or establishing group security.
98.
99.

Id.
Cf MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES (2011) (demonstrating that the tension between universality and efficacy distorts
decisions on whether law enforcement HRL applies extraterritorially).
100. Not surprisingly, the same or similar principles inform when states may intrude on
individual liberties in other areas of HRL and in many constitutional traditions. See, e.g., T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987)
(reviewing the use of balancing tests in U.S. constitutional law); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud
Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 73-76 (2008) (reviewing European, Commonwealth, Israeli, and international
practice).
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States may-and in some contexts must-intrude on individual liberties to
protect innocents and establish order. 101 The liberty-security principle captures that balance. The greater the threat and the less intrusive the deprivation
of liberty, the more expansive the state's coercive authority.
Of course, the cost or benefit of containing a threat may itself vary.
Preventing an attack on a military base is more crucial when a state's entire
security apparatus is at risk than when its authority is uncontested. Targeting
or detention might be proportional in one context but not another. As a general
rule, targeting satisfies the liberty-security principle if the person poses an
active, serious threat to bodily integrity. In that event, the benefit of a targeting
operation (protecting life or limb) is proportional to its cost (taking life).
Because detention intrudes less on individual liberty, a state initially has
broader authority to detain than to target. As the duration of detention
increases, however, so do its liberty costs. Detaining someone who poses
only a moderate threat may be lawful in the short term but become
disproportionate over time.
The mitigation principle further restricts the authority to target or detain
by requiring states to mitigate the liberty costs. States must try to contain a
threat using reasonable, less intrusive alternatives to targeting or detention.
Reasonableness here depends primarily on two factors. One is state control.
The greater a state's control, the more varied its toolbox and the more comfortably it can contain a threat without resorting to targeting or detention. 102
The second factor is the relative efficacy of the alternatives. This factor requires some judgment about the risks and merits of each option. A measure
might be a reasonable alternative even if it is not guaranteed to be equally
effective. For example, a state might have to capture instead of kill someone,
IOI. This balance is evident not only in the prescriptions on targeting and detention but
also in the law's more general precepts. In IHL, the twin tenets of military necessity and humanity permit states to intrude on individual liberties when necessary-but only when
necessary-to achieve a military victory and thereby terminate the enemy's threat. See Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes
Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. I) 474 [hereinafter St. Petersburg
Declaration], translated in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 91 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 2004); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. FM 27-10,
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE paras. 3-4 (1956). In HRL, the same balance appears in the
tension between obligations to respect and protect. Obligations to respect require states not to
intrude on individual liberties. Obligations to protect require such intrusions when necessary
to protect other people from serious harm. See Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, supra
note 18, at 354-55.
I 02. A similar insight animates the domain method's shift from the law enforcement to
an emergency or armed conflict domain. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 174 (permitting derogation when "life of the nation" is threatened); ICRC, Third Expert
Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities: Summary Report, at 56 (Oct. 2325, 2005) [hereinafter ICRC, Third Expert Meeting], available at http://www.icrc.org/
eng/assets/files/other/2005-09-report-dph-2005-icrc.pdf ("[I]n armed conflict, the government
was by definition not in total control of the situation."); Sassoli & Olson, supra note 3, at 614
("[C]ontrol over the place where the attack takes place is ... a factor causing human rights to
prevail over humanitarian law."). This insight also informs the extraterritorial application of
HRL. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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even though capture always presents a marginal risk of escape. But states
need not pursue measures that are unsuitable for or realistically might compromise the security mission. Similarly, they need not take measures that are
unlikely to mitigate the liberty costs.
The mistake principle is about the margin of error. States must try to
verify that (1) the specific person being targeted or detained (2) poses a sufficiently serious threat (3) that cannot reasonably be contained less
intrusively. In other words, states must exercise due diligence to avoid mistakes and establish a reasonable and honest belief that their conduct is
lawful. That diligence is generally less when a state acts in the heat of the
moment than when it acts with time for deliberation. Agents responding to
events as they unfold must act quickly and on the basis of imperfect information. With time, they have more opportunity to ensure the accuracy of
their assessments and consider the alternatives.
B. The Methodological Shift

Decisionmakers should use the functional principles instead of the domains to determine when states may target or detain nonstate actors. Doing
so would facilitate the discursive legal process. 103 Currently, decisionmakers
justify outcomes with domains that may be inapposite for the facts. When
no domain is directly on point, decisionmakers easily select the one that
suits their interests, exploiting its overly broad or narrow implications and
talking past those who adopt a different domain. That dynamic is exacerbated because IHL and HRL have distinct epistemic communities. 104 Both
within states and internationally, the actors that engage with and specialize
in each regime differ. Each community dabbles in the other regime but ultimately is committed to and speaks the language of its own. 105 Neither
effectively constrains the other. 106 By contrast, the functional principles provide a common framework for justifying and debating outcomes. Using

I 03. Cf Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Essay, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (2010) (arguing that amorphous
standards might induce moral deliberation because "[r]ather than applying a rule by rote, citizens must ask themselves, for example, ... whether they are behaving reasonably").
104. See Peter M. Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordinationlntroduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG.
I, 3 (1992) (defining epistemic community as a "network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area").
105. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law-20 Years
Later, 20 EuR. J. INT'L L. 7, 9 (2009) (explaining that "the creation of special regimes of
knowledge and expertise" leads to "struggle[s] between competing expert vocabularies, each
equipped with a specific bias").
106. Cf GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Zenon Bankowski ed.,
Anne Bankoska & Ruth Adler trans., 1993) (explaining that different epistemic communities
need a shared language to communicate effectively).
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those principles would better hold decisionmakers accountable. 107 Extreme
positions would be more difficult to defend on the merits than by reference
to opaque categories. Compromise positions would be more appealing. A
position that garners broad support is less likely to elicit condemnation and
more likely to be treated as legitimate.
To be sure, the functional approach does not yield single correct outcomes. It focuses decisionmakers on the right questions and suggests
comparative answers-i.e., that targeting or detention is more lawful in one
scenario than in another. Nevertheless, using the functional approach should
lead to more certainty. First, it would remove current impediments to
agreement. 108 Second, it might motivate decisionmakers to retreat from
hardline positions and support more defensible compromises. 109 Third, it
would occasionally narrow the range of plausible outcomes. Outcomes that
are prominent in the literature and justifiable using the domains are sometimes indefensible on the merits. 110
Some readers will resist my argument. Advantages that I claim for my
functional approach are typically associated with more formal rules and categories. The relative rigidity of formalism is said to constrain discretion and
ensure more certainty. Further, formalism might better satisfy the substantive interests at stake. Certain decisionmakers-like states-might
systematically reach undesirable outcomes when applying malleable standards. Formal rules help protect against that result. 111 Those arguments for
formalism may be compelling in theory, but they are not grounds for maintaining the domains. Only the combatant domain functions anything like a
formal rule, and it does so only when applied to lawful combatants. Someone's combatant status is usually evident from his uniform and dispositive on
the outcome. Efforts to extend the domain to a category of nonstate actors
(i.e., quasi-combatants) have not achieved comparably determinate results. 112
All other domains define the authority to target and detain using flexible
standards. 113 Most of those standards are undeveloped and, if anything, less

107. Cf Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 34-36 (1986) (explaining that balancing tests foster
accountability by engaging decisionmakers in "a communicative practice of open and
intelligible reason-giving, as opposed to self-justifying impulse and ipse dixit"); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court, /991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 67 (1992) ("[R]ules favor the judicial abdication of responsibility,
while standards make the judge face up to his choices ....").
108. See supra Part I.
109. See, e.g., irifra Section III.B.2.
110. See, e.g., infra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
111. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1993) (discussing
benefits of formalism).
112. See supra Sections I.A-1.B.2.
113. See ICCPR, supra note 82, arts. 6, 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174-76 (no arbitrary deprivations in law enforcement HRL); id. art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 (no unnecessary deprivations
during emergencies); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, art. 34, 6 U.S.T. at 3540, 75
U.N.T.S. at 310 (no unnecessary detention of civilians); cf Additional Protocol I, supra note
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precise than my principles. 114 Law enforcement standards are to some extent
different. Ordinary HRL has a rich common law developed by states, U.N.
organs, courts, treaty bodies, and other actors. On the continuum between
hard rules and mushy standards, law enforcement standards have moved
closer to rules; or at least, they are more specific than my principles. Thus,
one might wonder whether, to the extent those standards apply, they would
better limit discretion and curb abuse
They probably would not. First, decisionmakers sometimes evade law
enforcement standards by shopping into other domains. Doing so affords
them at least as much discretion as my principles. Second, and despite what
the domain method presupposes, law enforcement standards do not mandate
particular results. Rather, most decisionmakers apply the standards differently, depending on the facts. 115 For example, the European Court of Human
Rights has repeatedly applied law enforcement standards to assess Russia's
response to Chechen terrorism; it has applied those standards leniently.
Recognizing that the situation "called for exceptional measures," Isayeva v.
Russia suggested that Chechen fighters were targetable, even absent the sort
of imminent threat that HRL ordinarily requires. 116 Khatsiyeva v. Russia left
open the question of whether Russia could lawfully target nonfighters "for
mere failure to comply with official safety instructions" 117-an outcome that
would be unthinkable in a law enforcement setting. Finally, the recent decision in Finogenov v. Russia expressly recognized that law enforcement
standards apply more loosely when the facts so require-in this case, because Russia was pressed for time and lacked situational control. 118 The idea
1, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (no targeting of civilians unless they are directly participating in hostilities).
114. See infra Section 111.B.1 (civilian targeting); Section IV.A.2 (emergency and civilian detention); cf infra Section IV.A.2 (law enforcement detention).
115. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Weapons
Case), Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226, 'l[ 25 (July 8) (reading HRL to incorporate IHL
during conflicts); Fats Borda v. Colombia, Commc'n No. 46/1979, 'l['l[ 12.3, 13.2, 13.4, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/16/D/46/1979 (Human Rights Comm. July 27, 1982), reprinted in I HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM. DECISIONS, supra note 94, at 139, 143-44 (applying HRL to permit pure security detention during insurgency); Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism
and Human Rights, 'l['l[ 21-22, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.116 (Oct. 22, 2002) (interpreting HRL to permit targeting when necessary to maintain order); Malinowski Comment, supra note 47
(interpreting HRL more permissively for certain extraterritorial operations than for domestic
operations). But see Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789,
843-48 (2011) (requiring HRL's ordinary outcomes for military detention in Iraq).
116. App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 833 (2005); cf Khatsiyeva v. Russia,
App. No. 5108/02, 'l['l[ 134-137 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 7, 2008) (leaving open whether officers
could lawfully target someone on the ground that he was armed, absent evidence that he posed
an imminent threat).
117. Khatsiyeva, at 'l[ 139.
118. Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 18299, 'l[ 211 (2011) ("[T]he Court may occasionally depart
from that rigorous standard of 'absolute necessity' ... [because) its application may be simply
impossible where ... the authorities had to act under tremendous time pressure and where
their control of the situation was minimal."); id. at 'l[ 213 (granting Russia a margin of appreciation on measures to contain threat).
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that law enforcement standards constrain decisionmakers or mandate particular outcomes is at best dubious. Third, outcomes for law enforcement
settings tend to be settled not because of the domain per se but because the
domain usually operates against a background of shared expectations. 119
Decisionmakers widely agree on when states may target or detain people
in law enforcement settings. Using a functional approach is unlikely to
change those expectations. Rather, decisionmakers likely would apply the
functional principles as they now apply the (also flexible) law enforcement
standards.
Still, formalists may object that my principles appear less administrable
than the domains. Legal categories are often imperfect at the margins but
administratively useful because they lessen the burden of deciding each case
on its facts. The domains do not serve that function. In all but the combatant
domain, targeting and detention require an individualized assessment of the
facts. Of course, decisionmakers have ways to alleviate that burden: they
rely on precedents, make rebuttable presumptions, issue policy directives for
officers in the field, and so on. Neither method precludes decisionmakers
from treating factually similar cases alike. But because each domain
accommodates a range of plausible outcomes, depending on the facts,
selecting a domain does not obviate the need for fact-specific review.
The combatant domain is again different. It alleviates that burden by permitting targeting and detention on the basis of someone's status. Yet here
again the combatant domain fails to achieve comparable benefits when extended to nonstate actors. Because nonstate fighters rarely identify themselves
as such, most cases still require an individualized assessment of the facts. 120
Consider the U.S. experience with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. U.S. law permits
the government to detain members of those groups on the basis of their membership.121 However, because membership is inconspicuous, assessing
someone's detention requires reviewing the specific facts of his case. 122 Applying the combatant domain does not lessen that administrative burden. It

119. Cf Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International
Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 716--18, 763 (2008) (explaining that elastic principles may
shed their indeterminacy by developing shared meanings through the discursive process); W.
Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in I EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLWALE ELIAS 135 (Emmanuel G. Bello & Bola A.
Ajibola eds., 1992) (explaining that the legal effect of formal rules depends on the extent to
which they reflect communal expectations).
120. Admittedly, extending the combatant domain to quasi-combatants who identify
themselves would lessen this administrative burden. But the functional approach can achieve
comparable benefits. For example, decisionmakers might presume that people in uniform pose
a threat, absent evidence to the contrary. See infra notes 126, 178-181 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d I, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
122. See, e.g., id. at 9-10; AI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870-75 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("[I]t is impossible to provide an
exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is 'part of' al Qaida. That
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal
approach ....").
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simply focuses the factual review on the indicia of membership, instead of
on the more relevant questions of liberty-security, mitigation, and mistake.
Ideally, one might prefer to reform rather than discard the domain method. One might create new domains or better delineate existing domains, and
in each, define the authority to target or detain in more rule-like terms. For
those options to work, decisionmakers must agree both on how to classify
situations and on the correct outcomes. 123 As long as widespread disagreements persist, efforts to fix the domain method will be contentious and fail.
Meanwhile, focusing on the domains, rather than on the relevant substantive
considerations, will continue to frustrate the discursive legal process.
III. TARGETING

Having presented the general contours of my approach, I tum to its specifics. In this Part of the Article, I demonstrate that the functional principles
(1) animate the existing law on targeting and (2) equip decisionmakers to
develop and enforce that law.
A. Explaining Targeting Law

1. Liberty-Security
Targeting law is fairly settled when a situation clearly falls in the combatant or law enforcement domain. 124 In both domains, the liberty-security
principle defines who is potentially targetable: people who pose an active,
serious threat of deadly force. Combatants presumptively pose that threat. 125
IHL licenses them to kill and presumes that they are organized in war for

123. Moreover, they periodically would have to update the domains. An approach that
makes sense today might become obsolete or ill-suited for new realities; nonstate threats are
multifarious and ever-changing. Compare Sloane, supra note 14 (advocating new domain for
conflicts against networks like al-Qaeda), with Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 429, 435 (20IO) (explaining
that such networks may no longer pose the primary terrorism threat to the West).
124. I examine the combatant domain, even though it almost never applies by its terms to
nonstate actors, because many consider it relevant to developing the law for nonstate actors.
Unlike in the combatant and law enforcement domains, the law on targeting civilians is heavily contested. See infra Section III.B. I. Further, the emergency domain has no independent
content. Under most HRL treaties, targeting obligations are nonderogable. See IACHR, supra
note 82, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174; see
also ACHPR, supra note 82 (containing no derogation provision). Law enforcement HRL
applies, unless the situation amounts to an armed conflict, and IHL provides the lex specialis.
The ECHR achieves the same result with a different forrnula: states may derogate only to the
extent consistent with IHL. See ECHR, supra note 82, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
125. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 17, at 126 ("All soldiers who are not injured or captured
are presumed to be 'seeking to kill[]' ...."); Geoffrey Com, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflicts, I J. INT'L
HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52, 77 (2010) ("[A]pplication of deadly force is justified based
on status ... which itself is based on a conclusive presumption that operational opponents
pose a constant threat of deadly force ....").
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that purpose. However, those who demonstrably do not pose a sufficient
threat, because they are hors de combat, are not targetable. 126
In law enforcement settings, HRL prohibits targeted killings that are
disproportionate to their intended ends. 127 A targeted killing is disproportionate unless the target poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury. 128 If
he poses a lesser threat 129 or no longer poses a threat, 130 the benefit of incapacitating him does not justify depriving him of life. He is not targetable.
2. Mitigation
Even when the threat is serious, a state must use reasonable nonlethal
measures to contain it. Measures that are reasonable in law enforcement
settings-where states exercise considerable control1 31 -are almost always

126. Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 41, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 22; see also id. art.
8(a)-(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 10 (defining the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked as those who
"refrain from any act of hostility"). Readers may wonder why combatants have immunity only
if they are hors de combat and not if they otherwise do not pose a serious threat. Part of the
answer lies in the mistake principle. All combatants fighting on the same side wear identical
insignia and mingle with one another. Distinguishing harmless combatants from the vast majority who pose a threat is often infeasible. See Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14,
at 24 ("[M]ost attacks will be launched against groups of individuals or in time-sensitive situations in which distinction based on function will prove highly difficult."); Ariel Zemach, The
Unpleasant Responsibilities of International Human Rights Law, 38 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 421,432 (2010) ("The principle of military necessity was relaxed to allow the killing of
combatants at all times because of this lack of capacity to determine, with regard to each enemy soldier, whether and to what extent he actually contributes to the enemy's war effort.").
But cf Blum, supra note 17, at 148-49 (arguing that distinguishing among combatants is now
practicable, given sophisticated technologies). Requiring states to distinguish among combatants might also divert attention from the more critical task of distinguishing combatants, who
generally pose a threat, from civilians, who generally do not.
127. See, e.g., Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use
of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, at 110-11, U.N. Doc.
NCONF.144/28/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. 91.IV.2 (1991) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles];
Alston, Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 67, 'l[ 32; Nachova v. Bulgaria, 2005-VII Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1, 25 ("[A]ny use of force must be ... strictly proportionate in the circumstances.").
128. See, e.g., U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 127, 'l[9; Nachova, 2005-VII Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 26; Alejandre v. Cuba, Case No. 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 86/99,
OAS/Ser.UVffi.104, doc. 3 rev. 'l['l[ 43-45 (1999).
129. See, e.g., Petrov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 63106/00, 'l['l[ 48-50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 10,
2010); Solomou v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, 'l['l[ 75-78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 24, 2008); Nachova, 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28-29.
130. See, e.g., Leach v. Jamaica, Commc'n No. 546/1993, 'l[ 9.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
57/D/546/1993 (Human Rights Comm. July 18, 1996); Zambrano Velez v. Ecuador, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 166, 'l[ 108 (July 4, 2007).
131. HRL strongly presumes that states have sufficient control within their territories to
perform the basic functions of government while respecting human rights. See, e.g., Issa v.
Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 567,587 (2004) ("[J]urisdiction is presumed to
be exercised normally throughout the state's territory."); Assanidze v. Georgia, 2004-11 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 221,259 (noting a "presumption of competence" within the state).
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too burdensome during active combat. 132 HRL presumes that states usually
can contain threats without resorting to deadly force; it permits such force
only when necessary. HRL's necessity standard is commonly understood to
prohibit targeting unless no alternative for containing the threat exists. 133 In
fact, decisionmakers apply the standard more loosely-and consistently with
my mitigation principle. States need not pursue every available or even every
feasible altemative. 134 They must pursue only those that are reasonable for a
police operation.
For example, in Bubbins v. United Kingdom, a seemingly armed intruder
refused to vacate an apartment. 135 His unpredictable behavior weakened the
officers' control over the situation, but they still had measures that were paradigmatic of a law enforcement setting. The officers comfortably secured a
perimeter around the apartment, used flood lighting to enhance their visibility, directed neighbors to stay indoors, and encouraged the suspect to
surrender. Nevertheless, they did not pursue every feasible measure to avoid
the suspect's death. In particular, they did not use a trained negotiator to
broker an end to the siege. 136 Eventually, one of the officers targeted the suspect on the mistaken belief that he was about to shoot. The European Court
of Human Rights found that the government had acted lawfully; the court
treated as inconsequential the failure to use a trained negotiator. 137
The mitigation principle helps explain that outcome. First, the police officers properly tried to capture the suspect and targeted him only when they
thought that he was about to shoot. Absent that sort of imminent threat, law
enforcement HRL generally assumes that states may reasonably capture suspects. 138 Second, the officers acted lawfully, even without a trained negotiator,
132. See infra notes 148-159 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Montero Aranguren v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 'I[ 67 (July 5, 2006) ("[F]orce or coercive means can only be
used once all other methods of control have been exhausted and failed."); Alston, Study on
Targeted Killings, supra note 67, 'l[ 32 (targeting lawful only if "there is no other means ... of
preventing [a] threat to life"); MELZER, supra note 17, at 59 ("[T]he use of lethal force is held
to be permitted only as a last resort, when no non-lethal means are available ...."); see also
Giuliani v. Italy, App. No. 23458/02, 'I[ 214 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 24, 2011) ("[W]here different
means are available to achieve the same aim, the means which entails the least danger to the
lives of others must be chosen.").
134. See, e.g., Erdogan v. Turkey, App. No. 57049/00, 'l[ 99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 15, 2007)
(explaining that "it is not necessary to speculate on ... the possibility [of using] non-lethal
methods"); Andronicou v. Cyprus, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2059, 2102 (finding targeting lawful
without considering "the merits of alternative tactics").
135. App. No. 50196/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 (2005).
136. Id. at466,484-85.
137. Id. at 485-86.
138. HRL is sometimes interpreted to prohibit targeting absent this kind of imminent
threat. See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 183. Yet some practice suggests that targeting is
permissible in law enforcement settings, even absent an imminent threat, if capture is infeasible.
See U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 127, 'l[9 (permitting targeting when someone is fleeing
arrest without explicit imminence requirement); see also Baboeram-Adhin v. Suriname,
Commc'n Nos. 146/1983 and 148 to 154/1983, 'l[ 14.3 (Human Rights Comm. Apr. 4, 1985),
reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE OPTIONAL
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because they took other measures to reduce the risk of death. They took reasonable measures-though not all feasible measures-to mitigate the liberty
costs. Third, the police could have saved the suspect had several officers
stormed the apartment without deadly force. But officers generally need not
jeopardize their own lives to protect a suspect's. 139 Doing so risks equalizing
or even increasing-but not mitigating-the liberty costs. Fourth, the police
could have substantially lowered the risk of death by permitting the suspect to
flee and then looking for him after the fact. Yet officers need not take mitigating measures that compromise a legitimate police operation. The European
Court of Human Rights more squarely addressed that issue in Brady v. United
Kingdom. 140 In Brady, the government knew about a robbery in advance, so it
could have avoided the risk of death by arresting the robbers before the
crime or not arresting them at all. 141 The court determined that those options
were reasonably forgone because pursuing them might have undermined the
criminal case. 142
To be sure, decisionmakers sometimes disagree on whether the police
must pursue a particular alternative. 143 Bubbins and Brady are in tension
with McCann v. United Kingdom. 144 There, the government suspected that
three members of the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") were planning a terrorist attack in Gibraltar. Like in Brady, the government tried to catch the
suspects in the act. 145 It permitted the suspects to enter Gibraltar and then
killed them on the mistaken belief that they were about to detonate a bomb.
The European Court of Human Rights condemned the killing, in part because the government could have contained the threat by preventing the
PROTOCOL, at 172, 175, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.l (1990) (underscoring that the state "failed to submit any evidence proving that [victims] were shot while
trying to escape").
139. See Bubbins, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 483; Brady v. United Kingdom, App. No.
55151/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2001).
140. App. No. 55151/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2001).
14 l. The Brady court asserted that arresting the suspects before the robbery still would
have put the suspects' lives in danger. Id. That explanation is insufficient. First, the police did
not suspect that the robbers were armed until arriving at the scene of the crime. Second, even
if both scenarios presented a risk of death, that risk might be considerably higher during the
robbery than beforehand.
142. Id. ("[T]he decision not to arrest the men until they attempted to enter the premises
cannot be regarded as unreasonable .... [Otherwise] there would have been no possibility of
bringing criminal charges or a prosecution."); see also Romijn v. Netherlands, App. No.
62006/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 3, 2005) (explaining that storming an apartment without warning
was lawful because the victim was suspected of serious offenses and might have hidden or
destroyed evidence).
143. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying text. Compare Andronicou v. Cyprus,
1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2059, 2102-04 (majority opinion) (finding that state lawfully forwent
mitigating measures), with id. at 2118-19 (Jungwiert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
144. 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995). On the tension, see Juliet Chevalier-Watts, A Rock
and a Hard Place: Has the European Court of Human Rights Permitted Discrepancies to
Evolve in Their Scrutiny of Right to Life Cases?, 14 INT'L J. HuM. RTS. 300 (2010).
145. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59.
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suspects from entering Gibraltar. 146 The dissenting judges took a position
more in line with Brady: the government reasonably admitted the suspects
into Gibraltar, because otherwise "there might not [have been] sufficient
evidence to warrant their detention and trial." 147 Though decisionmakers
occasionally disagree about the reasonableness of forgoing particular alternatives, that is the HRL inquiry. States need not exhaust all available
alternatives to targeting.
The mitigation principle appears to be inconsistent with the combatant
domain because states may target combatants as an option of first resort.
However, all of IHL rests on the tenets of military necessity and humanity.
Those tenets mirror the mitigation principle. They provide that states may
inflict human suffering only to the extent necessary for the military mission. 148 The combatant domain then specifies those tenets for situations
involving combatants. The domain is designed for active combat, where all
combatants not hors de combat are presumptively armed and ready to kill. It
presumes that state agents have little situational control and few, if any, mitigating measures. 149 States reasonably forgo any nonlethal measure that
might contain the combatant's threat. 150
Even in law enforcement settings, officers may target people who appear
armed and ready to kill. 151 The combatapt domain is different because it
permits targeting when the state knows that it may easily capture someone.
Such cases are extremely rare in international conflicts. 152 A combatant who
appears unarmed and alone might be involved in a ruse, or his compatriots
might be just around the corner. The combatant domain declines to muddy
its otherwise rule-like prescription-targetable unless hors de combat-for
the exceptional case in which an officer knows that he can capture a combatant without putting himself at serious risk or undermining his mission.

146. Id. at 61.
147. Id. at 67-68 (Ryssdal et al., jointly dissenting).
148. See supra note 101.
149. See ICRC, Third Expert Meeting, supra note 102, at 56 ("[l]n armed conflict, tl!e
government was by definition not in total control of tl!e situation."); Marco Sassoli, The Role
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 34, 86
(Oma Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) [hereinafter Sassoli, New Conflicts] ("IHL was made for hostilities ... in a place that is not under the control of those who attack ....").
150. Cf ICRC, Fifth Expert Meeting on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities:
Summary Report, at 17 (Feb. 5-6, 2008) [hereinafter Fifth DPH Report] ("In tl!e harsh realities of combat or serious crime, where hesitation could easily cost someone's life, neither
soldiers nor police officers should be asked to second guess tl!eir judgments as to the necessity
of deadly force.").
151. See, e.g., Olah v. Hungary, App. No. 56558/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 14, 2004) (finding targeting lawful, even though suspect was unarmed, because policeman believed his life
was in danger); Brady v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55151/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2001)
(finding targeting lawful because officer "honestly believed tl!at it was necessary to shoot
[victim] in order to protect himself').
152. See DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 80-81.
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The ICRC recently proposed applying the mitigation principle on a caseby-case basis instead of categorically. 153 The proposal is controversial, 154 in
part because it is so poorly articulated and defended. 155 The proposal uses
necessity language, which (like in HRL) suggests that states must capture
combatants whenever possible. 156 In fact, the ICRC seems to intend a
standard more compatible with my mitigation principle. The ICRC
recognizes that, under its proposal, states would almost never have to
capture combatants in international conflicts. 157 The ICRC's examples of
when capture would be required all suppose that the state has substantial
control and can incapacitate the combatant without serious risk to its agents
or mission. 158 I take no position on whether, for combatants who are state
agents, the mitigation principle should apply categorically or on a case-bycase basis. 159 The point here is that the traditional prescription and the ICRC
proposal both try to specify the mitigation principle for situations involving
combatants.
3. Mistake
Before pulling the trigger, states must try to avoid mistakes. They must
exercise due diligence to verify that the targeting is lawful. IHL assumes no
serious risk of mistake once someone is properly classified as a combatant.
Combatants are generally identifiable and targetable. The risk of mistake
increases, however, when someone's status is ambiguous. In that event, the
state must initially treat the person as a civilian. 160 It may target him only
after establishing an honest and reasonable belief that he is targetable. 161
153.

Id. at 77-82.

154. Id. at 78 n.212; see also W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Participation
in Hostilities" Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& PoL. 769, 783-85 (2010) (describing disagreement).
155. See Garraway, supra note 3, at 506-08; Fifth DPH Report, supra note 150, at 19
("[S]everal experts criticized that it was not clear from the Interpretive Guidance how the
[proposal] should apply in operational practice."). Objectors have contested both the necessity
language and the failure to recognize a margin of error. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Clearing the
Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, 59 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 180, 191-92 (2010); Parks, supra note 154, at 814-16. My method addresses
both concerns.
156. See DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 80 ("[N]o more death, injury, or destruction
[may] be caused than is actually necessary ....").

Id. at 80-81.
See id.
159. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
160. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 ("In case of
doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian."); see also
Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement, 'l[ 50 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) ("A person shall be considered to be a civilian for as long as there is
a doubt as to his or her real status.").
161. See Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 57(2)(a)(i), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29 (requiring states to "do everything feasible to verify" the accuracy of their targets); COMMENTARY ON
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 67, at 682 (explaining that states must act with "common
157.

158.
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What the state must do to establish that belief depends on the circumstances. A prominent IHL treatise explains that, though states must prioritize
"the collection, collation, evaluation and dissemination of timely target intelligence," they ultimately are "judged on the basis of a reasonable and
honest reaction to the facts and circumstances known to them from information available at the time." 162 States must do more to verify their targets
when acting with the luxury of time than in the heat of the moment. 163 A
state conducting a time-sensitive operation has little opportunity to collect
and assess more targeting information, so IHL permits it more room for error.
The requirements under HRL are almost identical. Before shooting, a
state must exercise due diligence to verify that the person is targetable. 164
Here again, the state must do more when acting with time for deliberation
than when responding to events as they unfold. That distinction is evident in
McCann. The McCann court held that the agents who shot the suspects acted lawfully because those agents reasonably believed that the suspects were
about to detonate a bomb. 165 The court generally declined "with detached
reflection [to] substitute its own assessment of the situation for that of the
officers who were required to react in the heat of the moment." 166 By contrast, the agents who planned the operation acted unlawfully. Those agents
"had prior warning of the impending terrorist action and thus had ample
opportunity to plan their reaction" with more caution. 167
B. Developing and Enforcing Targeting Law

The combatant and Jaw enforcement domains are tailored for different
contexts but animated by the same principles. Targeting is lawful if (1) the
sense and good faith"); A.P.V. Rogers, 'Zero-Casualty Wa,fare, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 165,
181 (2000) ("Target verification requires reasonable care to be exercised."); Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Cenainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists,
108 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1387-90 (2008) (reviewing practice).
162. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 36, at 363.
163. See Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87
INT'L REv. RED CROSS 445,451 (2005); Waxman, Detention as Targeting, supra note 161, at
1411.
164. See, e.g., Olah v. Hungary, App. No. 56558/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 14, 2004); Brady
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55151/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 3, 2001); Andronicou v. Cyprus,
1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2059, 2106-08; Mccann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 58-59 (1995). Part of this assessment is to ensure that the correct person is targeted. See,
e.g., Giil v. Turkey, App. No. 22676/93, 'l[ 82 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 14, 2000); Zambrano Velez v.
Ecuador, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 166, 'l[ 85 (July 4, 2007).
165. McCann, 325 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 81.
166. Andronicou, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2107; see also, e.g., Erdogan, at 'l[ 99 ("[I]t is
not necessary to speculate on ... the possibility [of using] nonlethal methods ... [because]
police officers had to act rapidly ....").
167. McCann, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 57; see also Golubeva v. Russia, App. No.
1062/03, 'l[ 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 17, 2009) (reasoning that the operation was unlawfully
planned because "police had plenty of time to prepare the arrest operation carefully" and "circumstances no longer required the taking of immediate or spontaneous decisions").
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person poses a threat of deadly force, (2) the state pursues reasonable
alternatives for containing that threat, and (3) the state exercises due
diligence to prevent mistakes. Decisionmakers should use those principles to
develop and enforce the law when the domain or outcome is contested.
l. Targeting Noncombatants

Consider situations of internal strife, for which the domain method is
especially incoherent. Three domains are potentially in play-law enforcement, civilian, and combatant. None has a defined scope of application. 168
Moreover, whenever the civilian domain applies, its outcomes are contested.
Decisionmakers disagree 169 on how to interpret article 51(3) of Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which provides that civilians are targetable "for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 170
The functiohal approach provides a substantive framework for developing the law, while avoiding the tangled domain question. For starters, the
liberty-security principle captures expectations on when conduct poses a
sufficient threat to justify taking someone's life. Under the direct participation standard, the conduct must cause the enemy some temporally and
geographically proximate harm. 171 Killing a soldier constitutes direct participation; working in a munitions factory does not. Many scenarios are less
clear-cut and thus contested, 172 but the direct participation standard is-like
my liberty-security principle-fact-dependent. To determine whether conduct is sufficiently proximate, decisionmakers assess it against certain
well-versed examples, taking into account the specific "location and attire,
and other information available at the time." 173
168. See supra Sections I.B.1-3.
169. See CIL STUDY, supra note 54, at 23 ("[A] clear and uniform definition of direct
participation in hostilities has not been developed ...."); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing
Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL.
697, 700 (2010) [hereinafter Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation] ("There are few
IHL topics as timely or contentious as direct participation in hostilities.").
170. Additional Protocol I, supra note I, art. 51 (3), 1125 U.N. T.S. at 26.
171. See COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 67, at 619; BOTHE ET
AL., supra note 36, at 30 I.
172. On current disagreements, compare DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 16, with Bill
Boothby, "And for Such Time as": The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities,
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 741, 743 (2010). On areas of agreement, see BOTHE ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 303, and Ryan Goodman, Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, Harvard Law Sch., The Second Annual Solf-Warren Lecture in International and Operational Law, Lecture Before the Fifty-Seventh Graduate Course at the Judge
Advocate General's Legal Center and School (Apr. I, 2009), in 201 MIL. L. REv. 237, 244
(2009).
173. U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY ET AL., THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS para. 8.2.2 (July 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-0142-A, Judgement, 'l[ 178 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Fonner Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) ("Such an
enquiry must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the individual circumstances ...."). The ICRC has proposed a general definition of "direct participation" to replace
the case-by-case approach described in the text. DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 16. The pro-
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Despite those similarities, the liberty-security principle identifies more
sharply the policy consideration at issue: not whether the person's conduct is
directly linked to hostilities, but whether killing him is proportional to the
threat he poses. 174 That distinction sometimes matters. For example, IHL
experts have difficulty explaining why civilians who attack other civilians
should be targetable. 175 Attacking civilians is not directly participating in the
hostilities because it is not aimed at the enemy side. The liberty-security
principle explains that the civilian attacker is targetable because killing him
is proportional to his attack. Similarly, the principle explains why people are
not targetable merely on the basis of past participation. 176 Their threat must
be active.
More critically, the liberty-security principle provides guidance on two
ongoing debates. First, it suggests that members of an armed nonstate group
are targetable only when they themselves pose a sufficient threat. 177 Though
someone's association with the group is evidence of a threat, its probative
value depends on the nature of the group and his affiliation. 178 Recall that
even those who advocate a broad membership rule implicitly exclude people
posal is contested. One problem is that whether conduct poses a sufficient threat sometimes
depends on its context. For example, though making weapons in a factory does not reveal a
sufficient threat, making an improvised explosive device ("IED") might. See Michael N.
Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the
Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 795, 833 n.180 (2010) (explaining that experts disagree
on the IED example).
174. See, e.g., BOTHE ET AL., supra note 36, at 301 ("[W]hile participating directly in
hostilities they present an immediate threat to the adverse Party ...."); Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 64, at 269 ("[A] civilian who takes part in hostilities ... present[s] an immediate
threat to the adverse Party ...."). Professor Schmitt has argued that "the reason civilians lose
protection while directly participating is because they have chosen to be part of the conflict; it
is not because they represent a threat." Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, at 37.
That explanation is insufficient even for Professor Schmitt. Schmitt appreciates that civilians
who attack other civilians should "somehow" be treated as direct participants, even when their
conduct is not part of the conflict. See Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation, supra
note 169, at 720-22.
175. See, e.g., DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 16, 76; Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct
Participation, supra note 169, at 720-22.
176. IHL experts generally agree that someone's past participation does not by itself
justify targeting him. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 502-04 (lsr.); Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra
note 64, at 269; Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, at 38.
177. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
178. For similar approaches, see Targeted Killing Case, 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. at 501-04,
and Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Judgement, <JI 34 (Int'! Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005). Membership is evidence of a threat because armed groups
are generally more dangerous than lone actors. See Kenneth Watkin, Humans in the CrossHairs: Targeting and Assassination in Contemporary Armed Conflict, in NEW WARS, NEW
LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS 137, 147-48 (David
Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005). The same idea is built into the armed conflict
test. See COMMENTARY ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 67, at 1352 (explaining that
organization suggests the capacity to "plan[] and carry[] out sustained and concerted military
operations," as opposed to mere banditry or common crimes).
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who loosely affiliate with the group or participate only in a nonmilitary faction.179 By contrast, someone's association with the group is strong evidence
of a threat when it reveals that he is integrated into the military element.
Further, his association might increase the likelihood, for purposes of the
mistake principle, that the state will reasonably but mistakenly target him. 180
It does not justify targeting him if the state believes that he does not pose a
serious threat. 181
Second, the liberty-security principle directs the debate on the so-called
revolving door. The debate asks whether civilians are targetable only while
in the act of directly participating (thus the revolving door) 182 or until they
stop participating altogether. 183 At their core, arguments for the door sound
in my liberty-security and mistake principles. Those who support the door
argue that civilians who are not actively participating in dangerous conduct
do not threaten the enemy. 184 Further, such civilians may blend in with the
general population, increasing the risk of mistake. 185 However, the door is
too broad a remedy. It would immunize someone from attack, even when the
state has good reason to believe that he poses a serious threat that cannot
otherwise be contained. My approach accommodates the door's underlying
interests while rejecting its remedy. Significantly, rejecting both the broad
membership rule for quasi-combatants and the revolving door for civilians
eliminates the need to identify the IHL domain, even using the domain
method. Civilians and quasi-combatants are both targetable if they pose a
sufficiently serious threat.

179. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
180. For the reasons why, see supra note 126.
181. Some readers may object that members of nonstate groups will have more protections than lawful combatants do. See MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET. AL., INT'L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 5 (2006); Watkin, Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 672.
But cf. MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY 11 (2009) (detailing "the widespread and
growing ambivalence that exists about the practical utility and moral defensibility of reciprocity" in IHL). As discussed, analogizing to lawful combatants does not work. Under
IHL, members of nonstate groups have neither combatant status nor the legal and practical
benefits of statehood. Moreover, because nonstate groups often have inchoate organizational structures, a broad membership rule casts too broad a net. See supra Sections I.B.1-2.
The counterargument-that states purposefully afford nonstate fighters only minimal protections under IHL-undervalues the simultaneous development of HRL. See W. Michael
Reisman, Remarks, Application of Humanitarian Law in Noninternational Armed Conflicts,
85 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 83, 85 (1991).
182. See, e.g., DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 70 ("The 'revolving door' of civilian protection is an integral part, not a malfunction, of IHL."); Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note
64, at 269.
183. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in lsr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing
Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 502--04 (lsr.); Boothby, supra note 172, at 758--66 (discussing
U.S., Canadian, and Israeli positions); Schmitt, Interpretive Guidance, supra note 14, at 38;
Watkin, Direct Participation, supra note 37, at 688-92.
184. See Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 64, at 269.
185. See DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 45.
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For the mitigation principle, no domain requires states to pursue nonlethal measures against someone who appears armed and ready to kill. 186 The
combatant domain goes further. It conclusively determines that states reasonably forgo nonlethal measures, unless a combatant is hors de combat.
That conclusion is unwarranted in internal conflicts. Counterinsurgency operations vary widely, from those that resemble ordinary police missions to
those involving high-intensity combat. The mitigation principle differentiates among such operations, instead of regulating all of them under either a
law enforcement or armed conflict paradigm.
Already, much of the practice is consistent with the mitigation principle,
suggesting that states with considerable control should try to capture instead
of target insurgents. The U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual explains that,
in internal conflicts, states may more effectively satisfy their military interests
by "using lesser means of force when such use is likely to achieve the desired
effects." 187 "As an insurgency ends" and the state exercises more control, "a
capture is better than a kill." 188 The Field Manual articulates good counterinsurgency strategy, not the U.S. position on a state's legal obligations. States
need not adopt that strategy. But where they establish the kind of control envisioned in the Field Manual, they more likely have reasonable alternatives for
containing a threat.
Other practice suggests that trying to capture insurgents is not just good
policy; it may be legally required of states that have considerable situational
control. Consider a few examples: 189
•

In Guerrero v. Colombia, the Colombian police raided a home where
they thought a guerilla group was holding a kidnapped official. 190 The
police did not find the official but waited for the suspects to return and
then killed them all. 191 The Human Rights Committee condemned the
killings under HRL. The committee underscored that the police seemed
in control of the situation and positioned to capture the suspects. 192

•

The Israeli Supreme Court determined in its Targeted Killing Case that
Palestinian terrorists are civilians who directly participate in hostilities

186. On the combatant and law enforcement domains, see supra Section III.A.2. Civilians who are armed and ready to kill are, under almost all definitions, directly participating.
187. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 3-24, ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY
FIELD MANUAL 1-25 (2006); see also id. at 2-2 ("[E]xcessive use of military force can frequently undermine policy objectives ....").
188. Id. app. A at A-8.
189. In addition to the examples in the text, see those in Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the /CRC's
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 831, 909-13 (2010).
190. Commc'n No. 45/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979 (Human Rights Comm.
Mar. 31, 1982), reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS COMM. DECISIONS, supra note 94, at 112.
191. Id. at 116.
192.

ld.atll7.
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without the revolving door. 193 The court then invoked Israeli domestic
law to prohibit targeting "if it is possible to act ... by means of a less
harmful measure." 194 Less harmful measures are "likely to be practical,"
the court explained, "where the army controls the territory where the
operation is being carried out." 195
•

Recall the ICRC proposal on mitigation. Though the proposal is intended for all conflicts, it focuses on 1% and is less controversial in situations
involving nonstate actors. 197 The proposal explains that whether a capture would be required turns largely on whether the state "control[s] the
circumstances and area in which its military operations are conducted."19s

•

Finally, several practitioners and commentators now argue that-as a
legal or practical matter-HRL provides the lex specialis for operations
that occur during armed conflicts but that are more police- than military-like.199

That practice cannot effectively be justified using the domain method,
because the practice is inconsistent with the ordinary outcomes in each domain. If insurgents are quasi-combatants and the combatant domain applies,
states may target them, no matter the alternatives. The same is true if insurgents are civilians who directly participate without the revolving door.
Civilians who directly participate with the door are not targetable, even if a
state lacks control or any alternative for incapacitating their threat. Finally,
HRL usually prohibits targeting absent an imminent threat. 200 The Targeted
Killing Case and the ICRC proposal envision more expansive targeting authority. The mitigation principle empowers decisionmakers to justify and
refine a practice that, though in the mainstream, has no "home" in the domain method.
Finally, states must try to lessen mistakes. 201 If someone is not actively
engaged in dangerous conduct, a state must have other reliable intelligence
193. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing Case)
2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 490-95 (lsr.).
194. Id. at 503.
195. /d.at504.
196. See DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 80-81.
197. Akande, supra note 155, at 191-92 (protesting the proposal by focusing on international conflicts); Parks, supra note 154, at 783-828 (same); see also Fifth DPH Report, supra
note 150, at 24-31 (explaining that several experts suggested limiting the proposal to situations involving nonstate actors).
198. DPH STUDY, supra note 14, at 80.
199. See, e.g., Droege, supra note 92, at 347; Sassoli & Olson, supra note 3, at 614; Dale
Stephens, Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations: A New Approach to Legal Interpretation, in THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 289, 311 (Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo ed., Naval
War Coll., Int'! Law Studies Ser. Vol. 86, 2010); Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force, supra
note 14, at 26-27.
200. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
201. For a similar approach, see HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel
(Targeted Killing Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 502---04 (lsr.).
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of his threat. Again, someone's association with an armed group is evidence
of a threat and increases the likelihood that the state will reasonably but mistakenly target him. However, when the threat is latent, the state will usually
have time to evaluate its intelligence and consider its alternatives. Its margin
of error should be narrower.
2. Targeting Terrorists
The functional approach is also preferable for defining the authority to
target suspected terrorists. Counterterrorism operations occur in a range of
settings, not only in those that resemble the law enforcement or armed conflict paradigm. The domain method cannot accommodate that variation. It
supposes that either law enforcement HRL or IHL governs.
That binary is out of step with the practice. Increasingly, decisionmakers
recognize that the authority to target terrorists turns on considerations tangential to the armed conflict test. 202 Although the United States claims a
global armed conflict, it underscores that its targeting decisions actually
"depend upon considerations specific to each case," 203 and that its "unqualified preference" is to capture rather than target terrorists. 204 Other states
have not endorsed the armed conflict claim. 205 But most states implicitly
acknowledge that the United States has more than its ordinary law enforcement authority in some nonbattlefield settings. 206 For instance, most states
applauded the U.S. operation targeting Osama bin Laden, even though Abbottabad was not in any meaningful sense an active theater of combat. 207
202. See, e.g., Targeted Killing Case, 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. at 480-83; Malinowski Comment, supra note 47; MELZER, supra note 17, at 9 ("[T]argeted killing is in the process of
escaping the shadowy realm of half-legality and non-accountability, and of gradually gaining
legitimacy as a method of counter-terrorism and 'surgical' warfare."); see also, e.g., Blum &
Heymann, supra note 71; Kretzmer, supra note 14; Afsheen Radsan & Richard Murphy,
Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1201. But see Complaint at 'l[ 4, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No.
10-cv-1469) ("Outside of armed conflict ... international law prohibit[s] targeted killing except as a last resort to protect against concrete, specific, and imminent threats ...."); Alston,
Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 67, 'l[ 31 ('The legality of a killing outside the context
'of armed conflict is governed by human rights standards ....").
203. Koh, ASIL Speech, supra note 38; see also Bellinger, LSE Speech, supra note 38,
at 739.
204. Brennan Speech, supra note 49.
205. See, e.g., Alston, Study on Targeted Killings, supra note 67, 'l[ 54; ANTHONY
DWORKIN, BEYOND THE "WAR ON TERROR": TOWARDS A NEW TRANSATLANTIC FRAMEWORK
FOR COUNTERTERRORISM (Eur. Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief No. 13, 2009),
available at http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR_counterterrorism_brief.pdf.
206. See, e.g., Brennan Speech, supra note 49 ("In practice, the U.S. approach to targeting ... is far more aligned with our allies' approach than many assume."); infra note 207 and
accompanying text.
207. Bin Laden Death Can Bring Peace: Malaysia, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May, 2,
2011, available at 512/11 AGFRP 08:57:54 (Westlaw); Bin Laden Death ls "Justice," Says
U.N. Leader, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 3, 2011, available at 5/2/11 AGFRP 16:07:53
(Westlaw); China Calls bin Laden Death "Positive Development", AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
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According to reports of the operation, bin Laden was neither in a hostile
position when killed 208 nor encouraged to surrender, 209 as law enforcement
HRL usually requires. 210
The functional approach equips decisionmakers to develop the law
consistently with their shared expectations. The bin Laden operation probably satisfied the liberty-security principle. Bin Laden controlled al-Qaeda
and participated in planning attacks that caused large-scale human casualties. The analysis would differ for someone with no leadership position or
special expertise. Al-Qaeda has a loose and unstable organizational structure, so many "members" have only tenuous connections to the group or
are extremely unlikely to cause the United States harm. They are not targetable merely because they are, in some sense, members. 211
May 3, 2011, available at 5/3/11 AGFRP 01:19:04 (Westlaw); NATO Urges Pakistan Progress
in Anti-Terror Fight, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 4, 2011, available at 5/4/11 AGFRP
14:04:27 (Westlaw) (quoting remarks of NATO Secretary General that "I think it has been
justified to carry out this operation against [bin Laden]"); Russia Hails bin Laden Killing,
Vows to Boost Cooperation, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 2, 2011, available at 512111
AGFRP 09:04:49 (Westlaw); Valentina Pop, EU Cheers Killing of Osama bin Laden, EUOBSERVER, May 2, 2011, http://www.euobserver.com/24/32248; Frank Zeller, Japan Welcomes
bin Laden Death as Progress, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May, 2, 2011, available at 512111
AGFRP 9:36:14 (Westlaw); see also Margalit, supra note 8 ("States hailed the American operation, did not question its legality, and thus signaled that they saw no violation of international
law.").
208. Nicholas Schmidle, Getting bin Laden: What Happened That Night in Abbottabad,
NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at 34, 43 (describing bin Laden as "froze[n]" and "unarmed").
209. See id. ('There was never any question of detaining or capturing him-it wasn't a
split-second decision. No one wanted detainees." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ken
Dilanian & Brian Bennett, Osama bin Laden's Surrender Wasn't a Likely Outcome in the
Raid, Officials Say, L.A. nMES, May 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/03/world/
la-fg-bin-laden-us-20110504 (reporting that U.S. agents intended to kill bin Laden absent his
unambiguous surrender).
210. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also U.N. Office of the High
Comm'r for Human Rights, Osama bin Laden: Statement by the UN Special Rapporteurs on
Summary Executions and on Human Rights and Counterterrorism (May 6, 2001),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display News.aspx ?News ID= l 0987 &LanglD=E
[hereinafter OHCHR Statement] (asserting that, to assess operation under HRL, "it will be
particularly important to know if the planning ... allowed an effort to capture Bin Laden");
Com, supra note 50, at 8 (asserting that "the nature of [such operations] make them inconsistent with peacetime law enforcement legal principles"); Margalit, supra note 8 (explaining
that HRL would permit targeting "[o]nly if an imminent danger to the life or physical integrity
of the attacking team or other individuals arose from Bin Laden during the raid"). Early reports mistakenly indicated that U.S. agents had tried to capture bin Laden; some
commentators relied on those reports to conclude that the operation was consistent with law
enforcement HRL. See Mark Leon Goldberg, Was bin Laden's Killing Legal? One Top UN
Expert Says So, UN DISPATCH (May 4, 2011), http://www.undispatch.com/was-bin-ladenskilling-legal-one-top-un-expert-says-so; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The bin Laden Aftermath:
Abbottabad and International Law, FOREIGN POLICY, May 4, 2011, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.
corn/posts/2011/05/04/the_bin_laden_aftermath_abbottabad_and_international_law.
211. The United States asserts that it may lawfully target anyone who belongs to alQaeda. See Koh, ASIL Speech, supra note 38 ("[I]ndividuals who are part of such an armed
group are belligerents and, therefore, lawful targets under international law."). But outside
battlefield settings, the United States tends to underscore the target's particular threat. See
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The mitigation principle differentiates among the many settings in
which counterterrorism operations occur. It generally requires states to
capture instead of target suspected terrorists. 212 A state threatened by suspects outside its jurisdiction usually must work with the territorial state. 213
However, forgoing a capture is sometimes reasonable. For example, no
domain requires states to try to capture someone when doing so would
seriously endanger state agents or undermine the operation. Thus, states
probably may target terrorists who are armed, assembled, and likely to
resist any exercise of governmental authority. 214 Similarly, deciding not to
work with the territorial state may be reasonable if that state is unwilling
or unable to contain a threat. 215 The relevant question for the bin Laden
operation is whether the United States reasonably forwent working with
Pakistan because of Pakistan's incompetence, duplicity, or corruption. 216
That question is more relevant and more likely to elicit a consensus than

Brief for Respondent at 'll'I[ 6-9, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10cv-1469); Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U.S. Operation Against Osama bin Laden,
OPINIO JURIS (May 19, 2011 6:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-theus-operation-against-osama-bin-laden/; Eric Holder, Speech at Northwestern University School
of Law, May 5, 2012, available at http://www.Iawfareblog.com/2012/03/text-of-the-attorneygenerals-national-security-speech/ (focusing on "senior operational leader[s] of al Qaida or
associated forces").
212. Compare, e.g., Brennan Speech, supra note 49 (preferring capture under IHL), with,
e.g., OHCHR Statement, supra note 210 (same under HRL).
213. See Presidential Decision Directive NSC/39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June
21, 1995), as reprinted in Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the S. Comm. Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 272 (1996) ("We shall
work closely with other governments to carry out our counterterrorism policy ....");
Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 179; Steven R. Ratner, Predator and Prey: Seizing and Killing
Suspected Terrorists Abroad, 15 J. PoL. PHIL. 251, 272-75 (2007); Nico Schrijver & Larissa
van den Herik, Leiden Policy Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law,
GROTIUS CTR., 'll'll 6-12, 30 (Apr. I, 2010) [hereinafter Leiden Recommendations],
http://www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/l/Leiden%20Policy%20Recommendations%201 %20
April%202010. pdf.
214. See Doswald-Beck, supra note 70, at 885; cf lsayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00,
41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 832-33 (2005) (suggesting that states need not try to arrest members
of rebel group who are armed and assembled); Finogenov v. Russia, App. No. 18299/03, 'JI 213
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2011) (affording state discretion on mitigating measures where state
lacked control and "terrorists were armed, well-trained and devoted to their cause").
215. I do not address whether an operation conducted without the territorial state's consent would violate that state's sovereignty or the ad helium prohibition on the use of force. No
consensus position exists on precisely when a state may use force against nonstate actors in
another state. See KreB, supra note 80, at 248. But many decisionmakers are coalescing
around an unable-or-unwilling standard. See, e.g., Leiden Recommendations, supra note 213,
'll'll 32, 42; Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Framework for
Extra-Territorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012); Christian Tams, The
Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EuR. J. INT'L L. 359 (2009). Interpreting the mitigation
principle to require the same would reduce current tensions between the jus ad helium on the
one hand, and IHL and HRL on the other hand.
216. See Jane Perlez, Pakistan Army Under Scrutiny After U.S. Raid, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2011, at Al (discussing doubts about Pakistan's willingness and ability to contain bin Laden).
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whether a U.S.-Qaeda conflict takes place throughout Pakistan. 217 If the
United States reasonably forwent working with Pakistan, then it should
not be constrained to its law enforcement authorities. 218 It had less capacity to control the situation in Abbottabad than, for example, the U.K. police
had in Bubbins-the case in which the police shot a supposed intruder
who refused to vacate an apartment.
The bin Laden operation probably also satisfied the mistake principle.
The United States reportedly spent months evaluating its intelligence and
options for containing bin Laden's threat. 219 Though it undoubtedly exercises less diligence in other operations, the United States declines to
describe its verification process. The mistake principle emphasizes that the
process for avoiding mistakes is relevant to an operation's legality. 220
Moreover, because drone technology permits the United States a better
opportunity to evaluate its intelligence and consider the alternatives, it
should be permitted less error when planning an operation with such technology than when responding to events as they unfold. 221
To be sure, decisionmakers might still disagree about how to specify
the law for counterterrorism operations. Even if they do, the functional
approach would help constrain their discretion. The domain method pushes the United States toward a legal position that is more extreme than its
practice. Recall that the United States asserts a global conflict not because
it intends to target al-Qaeda suspects worldwide but because it views the
alternative-applying HRL in all nonbattlefield settings-as too limiting.
Meanwhile, objectors lack effective tools for holding the United States
217. Compare sources at supra note 207 (showing international consensus on bin Laden
operation), with, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Bin Laden Killing: The Legal Basis, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (May 2, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/bin-laden-killing-legal-basis/
p24866 (global conflict covering Pakistan); Marko Milanovic, When to Kill and When to Capture, EHL: TALK! (May 6, 2011), www.ejiltalk.org/when-to-kill-and-when-to-capture/ (no
conflict in Abbottabad); O'Connell, supra note 210 (no conflict in Pakistan); Steve Ratner,
Comment to Was the Killing of Osama Bin Laden Lawful?, EJIL: TALK! (May 4, 2011 20:10),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/was-the-killing-of-osarna-bin-laden-lawful/#comrnents
[hereinafter
Ratner, bin Laden Comment] (conflict throughout Pakistan).
218. Cf MELZER, supra note 17, at 424 ("Particularly when targeting individuals outside
their territorial jurisdiction ... [s]tates are still reluctant to acknowledge their obligation to
respect the law enforcement paradigm.").
219. See Infographic, How Osama bin Laden was Located and Killed, N.Y. TIMES, May
8,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/02/world/asia/abbottabad-map-ofwhere-osama-bin-laden-was-killed.html.
220. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel (Targeted Killing
Case) 2006 (2) Isr. L. Rep. 459, 502 (Isr.) ("Properly verified information should exist with
regard to the identity and activity of [the suspect] ...."); Alston, Study on Targeted Killings,
supra note 67, 'I[ 93 (requesting information on verification measures); Blum & Heymann,
supra note 71, at 205 ("Any targeted killing operation must therefore include mechanisms ...
that would ensure an accurate identification."); Roth Letter, supra note 44 (requesting information on verification measures).
221. See also Radsan & Murphy, supra note 202, at 7 ("[B]ecause of superior sources of
intelligence and because the drone operator is not at risk of attack ... the CIA must ... identify its targets with a very high level of certainty.").
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accountable. Just as the wartime paradigm is ineffective in legitimizing
U.S. operations, the law enforcement paradigm is ineffective in constraining those operations. The United States easily dismisses law enforcement
HRL as inapplicable.
The functional approach would pressure the United States to defend its
practice on the merits and respond persuasively to counterarguments.
Extreme positions-like the U.S. claim that it may target any al-Qaeda
member no matter his specific threat-would be considerably more
difficult to defend. Moderate positions would be newly available. Instead
of invoking IHL, the United States might propose a hybrid that satisfies its
security interests and better legitimizes its operations internationally. It
clearly seeks to do both. As President Obama's chief counterterrorism
advisor recently explained, "The more our views and our allies' views on
these questions converge, without constraining our flexibility, the safer we
will be as a country." 222

IV.

SECURITY DETENTION

A. Explaining Detention Law
The law on security detention is less developed than the law on targeting. Each domain regulates security detention but leaves key questions
unanswered. 223 Still, the functional principles explain existing law better
than the domains do. Like for targeting, the principles account for the variation within each domain and the consistencies across domains.
1. Liberty-Security
All domains condition security detention on its necessity, which means
that detainees must actually pose a threat. Combatants presumptively do. 224
Those who demonstrably do not pose a threat are not detainable. Under the
Third Geneva Convention, states must repatriate combatants who are unlikely
to return to battle because of serious illness or injury. 225 Conversely, civilians
222. Brennan Speech, supra note 49; see also John B. Bellinger III, Editorial, Obama 's
Drone Danger, WASH. PosT, Oct. 3, 2011, at Al7 ("If the Obama administration wants to
avoid losing the tacit support (and potentially the operational and intelligence assistance) of its
allies for drone strikes ... it should try to ensure that they understand and agree with the U.S.
policy and legal justification.").
223. See, e.g., ICRC, supra note 28, at 18 (uncertainity on detention in nonintemational
conflicts); Bruce Oswald, The Law on Military Occupation: Answering the Challenges of
Detention During Contemporary Peace Operations?, 8 MELB. J. INT'L L. 311 (2007) (same
for peacekeeping operations); infra Section IV.B. l (same for counterterrorism operations).
224. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, arts. 21, 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-36, 3406,
75 U.N.T.S. at 152-54, 224; St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 101, 18 Martens Nouveau
Recueil (ser. l) 474.
225. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, arts. 109-110, 6 U.S.T. at 3400--02, 75
U.N.T.S. at 218-20. Where no prospect for recovery exists-because the combatant's injury or
illness is incurable, or his mental or physical fitness has been "gravely diminished"--the detaining state must send him home. Id. at art. 110; see also CHRISTIANE SHIELDS DELESSERT,
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presumptively do not pose a threat and generally are not detainable. However,
the Fourth Geneva Convention permits their detention when "absolutely necessary" for reasons of security. 226 For detention to be necessary, the detainee
himself must pose a threat. 227 He must be released if his threat passes. 228
To the extent that HRL permits security detention, it too requires that detention be necessary. Most HRL instruments prohibit arbitrary detentions. 229
Detention is arbitrary if it is unnecessary to satisfy a legitimate governmental
purpose. 230 Protecting people from hann is undoubtedly legitimate, and states
lawfully use varied forms of security detention. 231 But for reasons I discuss
below, law enforcement HRL strongly discourages or prohibits what I term
"pure security detention"-preventive security detention uncoupled from
other proceedings (e.g., a criminal investigation, deportation, or medical
evaluation). 232
The emergency domain is on its face more permissive. Most HRL treaties permit states to derogate from their detention obligations during public
emergencies. 233 Yet the treaties permit derogation only to the extent neces-

RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 112
(1977) ("The detention of a soldier whose mental and physical fitness has been gravely and
perhaps permanently impaired is clearly no longer a military necessity."). Where the combatant might recover, the detaining state may send him to a neutral country to reduce the risk that
he will return to battle and again pose a threat. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, arts.
109-110, 6 U.S.T. at 3400--02, 75 U.N.T.S. at 218-20.
226. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, arts. 42, 6 U.S.T. at 3540, 3544, 3566-68, 75
U.N.T.S. at 310,314, 336-38; see also id. at arts. 34, 78.
227. See Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative
Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 375,
381 (2005) ("A civilian can be interned in intematicmal armed conflict only on the basis of an
individual decision taken in every specific case."); cf Goodman, supra note 65, at 54 ("Having
political sympathy for or affiliation with the enemy power is wholly insufficient ...."); Laura
M. Olson, Guantanamo Habeas Review: Are the D.C. District Court's Decisions Consistent
with IHL Internment Standards?, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 197, 205-06 (2009) (having
valuable intelligence insufficient).
228. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, art. 132, 6 U.S.T. at 3606-08, 75
U.N.T.S. at 376-78; see also id. art. 43, 6 U.S.T. at 3544-46, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16 (requiring
periodic review "with a view to the favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit").
229. See ACHPR, supra note 82, art. 6, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 247; IACHR, supra note 82,
art. 7(2H3), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
Instead of prohibiting arbitrary detentions, the ECHR lists when detention is lawful. See
ECHR, supra note 82, art. 5(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
230. See, e.g., Shafiq v. Australia, Comrnc'n No. 1324/2004, 'Il 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (Human Rights Comm. Oct. 31, 2006) (explaining that detention is
"arbitrary if it is not necessary in all the circumstances of the case and proportionate to the
ends sought").
231. See infra notes 243-246 and accompanying text.
232. See infra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
233. IACHR, supra note 82, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. at 174; ECHR, supra note 82, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34; cf ACHPR, supra note 82, art. 27, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 251 (containing no derogation provision but limiting all
rights for reasons of "collective security").
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sary. 234 Thus, both during emergencies and in law enforcement settings,
states may use security detention only if necessary. Necessity must be assessed case-specifically. 235 Security detainees must actually pose a threat. 236
Although all domains require an active threat, none defines the threat
threshold. In keeping with the liberty-security principle, that threshold is
consistently lower for detention than for targeting. The differential threshold
does not arise for combatants because, unless they are hors de combat, they
presumptively pass the threshold for both. Civilians are targetable only
when they directly participate in hostilities. 237 They are detainable even
when they indirectly participate or otherwise pose an imperative security
threat. 238 Similarly, HRL permits security detention in varied scenarios
where targeting would be unlawful. 239
The liberty-security principle also suggests that the threat threshold
should rise with time. As the liberty costs increase, the benefits of containing the threat must be more substantial to remain proportional. 240
Admittedly, lifting the threshold finds only tenuous support in existing law.
All domains try to limit the duration of detention, 241 but none does so by
expressly requiring a more serious threat over time.
234. IACHR, supra note 82, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 4,
999 U.N.T.S. at 174; ECHR, supra note 82, art. 15,213 U.N.T.S. at 232-34.
235. See generally Khudoyorov v. Russia, App. No. 6847/02, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 144, 183
(2006) (requiring individualized assessment rather than general policy for pretrial detention);
Shafiq, at 'l[ 7.2 (finding immigration detention arbitrary because based on general policy instead of individualized assessment); infra note 263 and accompanying text (requiring
individualized review during emergencies).
236. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Second Periodic Report: Addendum: Israel, 'll'I[ 125-128, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (2001) (agreeing that detainees must pose threat); Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 'l[ 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (1998) (condemning detention of people "not personally threaten[ing to]
State security"). Where security detention is coupled with other proceedings, it may serve
multiple functions simultaneously. For example, immigration detention might both incapacitate a threat and prevent flight pending deportation. The detainee need not pose a threat if his
detention otherwise serves a legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g., Conka v. Belgium,
2002-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, 97 (immigration detention justifiable without finding of dangerousness).
237. Additional Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
238. See Goodman, supra note 65, at 53-55; see also ICRC, COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 257
(Jeans. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY GENEVA CONVENTION IV] ("It is ... left
very largely to Governments to decide the measure of activity prejudicial to the internal or
external security of the State which justifies [detention].").
239. See infra notes 243-245 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465-66 (D.D.C.
2005); Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 33977/96, 'll'I[ 80-81 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 26, 2001)
(explaining that, even when criminal offense is sufficiently serious to justify initial detention,
it may not justify prolonged detention).
241. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3406, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 224 (release combatants at end of hostilities); Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, arts.
132-133, 6 U.S.T. at 3606---08, 75 U.N.T.S. at 376-78 (release civilians at end of hostilities or

HeinOnline -- 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1409 2011-2012

1410

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 110:1365

2. Mitigation
The necessity of security detention depends not only on the person's
threat but also on the alternatives for containing that threat. Law enforcement HRL again assumes that states have considerable control and effective
alternatives for addressing everyday violence. States presumptively should
prosecute and punish people, rather than detain them without trial. Though
criminal and security detention both deprive people of liberty, the criminal
process is almost always accompanied by more robust procedural and substantive protections. In addition to lessening mistakes, those protections help
to ensure that people deprived of their liberty are treated fairly. 242
Though HRL prefers criminal to security detention, it permits security
detention when the criminal option is unsuitable for containing a threat.
States regularly use security detention while investigating a case but before
filing criminal charges. Such detention is lawful, even if the state lacks sufficient evidence to file charges and never does. 243 Similarly, states may coucouple security with immigration detention. 244 And they may detain people
who seriously threaten the public because of mental or infectious illness. 245
In each of those scenarios, the criminal process is inapt for addressing the
threat. States theoretically could release and monitor people rather than detain them, but that option is onerous and sometimes ineffective. 246 HRL
determines that states reasonably forgo that option in favor of security detention.
HRL is considerably more skeptical of pure security detention because it
seems like an end run around the criminal process. 247 HRL permits such

when no longer necessary); Fals Borda v. Colombia, Commc'n No. 46/1979, 'l['l[ 13.4, 14, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/16/0/46/1979 (Human Rights Comm. July 27, 1982), reprinted in l HUMAN
RIGHTS COMM. DECISIONS, supra note 94, at 139, 144-45 (condemning security detention
because of duration); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States

Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee: Cameroon, 'l[ 22, U .N. Doc. CCPR/Cn9/Add.33 (Apr. 18, 1994) (asserting that security detention
must be time-limited).
242. See Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
243. See, e.g., Tepe v. Turkey, App. No. 31247/96, 'll 59 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 21, 2004)
(explaining that ECHR "does not even presuppose that the police should have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges, either at the point of arrest or while the applicant was in
custody"); Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11, 29-30 (1988).
244. See, e.g., Ahani v. Canada, Commc'n No. 1051/2002, 'l[ 4.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/80/D/1051/2002 (Human Rights Comm. June 15, 2004); Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 1862-65.

See e.g., ECHR, supra note 82, art. 5(l)(e), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
Cf Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Introductory Note, Human Rights Committee & the
European Court of Human Rights-Treatment of Terrorism Suspects, 48 I.L.M. 567, 569
245.

246.

(2009) (discussing difficulties with control orders in United Kingdom).
247. See, e.g., HRC Israel Observations, supra note 86, 'l[ 7 ("Administrative detention
infringes detainees' rights to a fair trial ....").
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detention only in exceptional cases248 or during emergencies. 249 That authority is even narrower under the European system. The European Court of
Human Rights has determined that states may use pure security detention
only during emergencies. 250 In practice, however, the distinction between the
universal and European systems has been insignificant. Universal HRL rarely permits pure security detention outside of emergencies, and European
HRL affords states broad discretion to declare an emergency.251
Perhaps because HRL is so skeptical of pure security detention, it provides little guidance on when such detention is lawful. 252 What guidance we
have indicates that pure security detention may be lawful when mitigating
measures-especially the criminal process_:._are unsuitable. For example, in
Schweizer v. Uruguay, the Human Rights Committee explained that "administrative detention may not be objectionable in circumstances where the person
concerned constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which cannot be
contained in any other manner ...." 253 The European Court of Human Rights
provided slightly more guidance in Lawless v. Ireland2 54 :
[T]he ordinary criminal courts ... could not suffice to restore peace and
order; . . . the amassing of the necessary evidence to convict persons involved in activities of the IRA and its splinter groups was meeting with

248. See e.g., Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
& Prot. of Minorities, The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees:
Question of the Human Rights of Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Report on the Practice of Administrative Detention, 'I[ 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1990/29 (July 24, 1990) (by Louis Joinet) ("Governments might at the very least be
expected to use [administrative detentions] only in truly exceptional cases ...."); Human
Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee: Morocco, 'l! 21, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.44 (Nov. 23, 1994) (recommending "that measures of administrative detention ... be restricted to very limited and exceptional cases"); lnt'I Comm'n of Jurists,
Memorandum on International Legal Framework on Administrative Detention and CounterTerrorism, at 11-12 (Mar. 2006).
249. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 625, 707
(2009). The court's interpretation is not compelled by the ECHR text. ECHR, supra note 82,
art. 5(1)(c) (permitting detention when reasonably necessary to prevent someone from committing offense).
251. See A., 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 707 (explaining that, on derogation, "a wide margin of
appreciation should be left to the national authorities").
252. Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving
Beyond the Armed Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369 (2008) [hereinafter
Hakimi, Detaining Terrorism Suspects] (discussing lack of guidance). The European Court of
Human Rights regularly appraises the use of pure security detention during emergencies, but
its recent jurisprudence focuses on the process of review without addressing the substantive
authority to detain. See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2640, 2656--59; Askoy v.
Turkey, 1996--VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2279-84; Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 29, 50-51 ( 1993).
253. Cornmc'n No. 66/1980, 'l! 18.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/17/0/66/1980 (Human Rights
Comm. Oct. 12, 1982).
254. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1961).
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great difficulties[; and] ... these groups operated mainly in Northern Ireland .... 255

To be clear, the Lawless court did not determine that the criminal process
was ineffective against Lawless himself. It determined that the criminal process was inapt for the IRA threat more generally. 256
IHL permits pure security detention for much the same reason. 257 During
periods of organized high-intensity violence, states have little situational
control. Amassing the evidence and resources to prosecute everyone who
has committed a crime would be enormously burdensome and detract from
the more pressing mission of restoring order. IHL decides that, in war, states
need not devote their intelligence and security resources primarily to criminal prosecutions and convictions. In fact, IHL arguably prefers security
detention. Criminals might be punished with long-term sentences or death,
but security detainees must be released when their threat passespresumptively, before or at the end of hostilities. 258
3. Mistake
Detention differs from targeting in that states may meaningfully correct
mistakes after acting to contain the threat. Once someone is in custody,
states must verify that security detention is lawful. Here again, the combatant domain assumes no serious risk of mistake when people are properly
classified as combatants. 259 But unlike for targeting, IHL nowhere defines
the standard for detaining someone whose status is ambiguous. The closest
analog appears in article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention: in cases of uncertainty about whether someone who has committed a belligerent act is a
POW, the state must treat him as one until his proper status is determined by

255. Id. at 58.
256. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27; see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 80 (1978) ("Being confronted with a massive wave of violence and intimidation ...
[the governments] were reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation offered insufficient resources ....").
257. Cf COMMENTARY GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 238, at 258 (explaining
that security detention is justified only "if security cannot be safeguarded by other, Jess severe
means").
258. Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, arts. 21, 118, 6 U.S.T. at 3334-36, 3406, 75
U.N.T.S. at 152-54, 224; see Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, arts. 42-43, 6 U.S.T. at
3544-46, 75 U.N.T.S. at 314-16. In noninternational conflicts, detention may extend beyond
the cessation of hostilities if it remains necessary for reasons of security. See COMMENTARY
ON ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 67, at 1360.
259. Cf Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079, 1099 (2008) ("[E]rroneous detentions
were rare when the traditional scheme was applied to captured soldiers who wore uniforms
and were usually keen to obtain POW status.").
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a "competent tribunal." 260 States might use a similar process to verify that
people are detainable. 261
All other domains specifically mandate a prompt, meaningful, and independent process for lessening mistakes. HRL usually requires states to
review detentions through the criminal process, with all its procedural and
substantive controls. It implicitly permits more mistakes with security detention, but it still requires meaningful review. Under HRL, states must notify
security detainees of the reasons for detention and afford them the opportunity for prompt and independent judicial review. 262 Moreover, although
most HRL instruments permit states to derogate from their detention obligations, human rights organs consistently find that states either may not
derogate from or must provide an adequate substitute for the review process. 263 The Fourth Geneva Convention likewise requires states to afford
civilian-detainees notice, prompt review "by an appropriate court or administrative board," and the option of appealing that body's initial decision. 264
Though the law enforcement, emergency, and civilian domains all require
meaningful review, none defines the standard of certainty or specific contours
of the review process. The adequacy of the process almost certainly depends
260.
140-42.

Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3322-24, 75 U.N.T.S. at

261. See Enemy Prisoners of War, Related Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, Army Reg. 190-8 § 1-6(e)(10)(c) (Oct. I, 1997) (permitting article 5 tribunals to
determine that a detainee is an "[i]nnocent civilian who should be immediately returned to his
home or released"); Sean D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the "War on
Terrorism": Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons Deemed "Unprivileged Combatants", 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (2007) (arguing that article 5's spirit extends to
detention question). Cf Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793-95 (2008) (affording Guantanamo detainees judicial review on detention question); Brief for Respondents-Appellants at
10-12, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5265) (detailing administrative review of detentions in Afghanistan).
262. ACHPR, supra note 82, art. 7(l)(a), 1520 U.N.T.S. at 247; IACHR, supra note 82,
art. 7(6), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147; ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 9(4), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176; ECHR,
supra note 82, art. 5(3)-{4), 213 U.N.T.S. at 226. In addition, HRL requires that any detention
be grounded in law, meaning that states must prescribe in advance the permissible bases for
detention and then follow their own laws. ACHPR, supra note 82, arts. 6, 7(2), 1520 U.N.T.S.
at 247; IACHR, supra note 82, art. 7(2)-(3), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147; ICCPR, supra note 82, art.
9(1)-(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175; ECHR, supra note 82, art. 5,213 U.N.T.S. at 226.
263. See, e.g., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
No. 9, <J[ 41 (Oct. 6, 1987); Special Rapporteur on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights &
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Special Rapporteur on Torture & Other
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention
& Working Grp. on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development: Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context
of Countering Terrorism, <J[ 292(b), Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (May 20,
2010) (by Martin Schenin et al.); Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2284; Castillo
Petruzzi v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, <J[ 110 (May 30, 1999).
264. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 60, art. 43, 6 U.S.T. at 3544-46, 75 U.N.T.S. at
314-16; see also COMMENTARY GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 238, at 260.
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on its context. For example, though HRL requires a judicial process, IHL
permits an administrative one. 265 That distinction is sometimes justified by
the practical realities of war. 266 In wartime, the judicial system might be
closed, geographically removed from detainees, or overwhelmed by the
caseload. A state exercises due diligence when it uses a streamlined administrative process. The same process would be unduly cursory during periods
of stability.
Because states must lessen mistakes after the initial decision to detain,
extended detention may be unlawful even if the state could have targeted the
person at the time of capture. 267 An honest and reasonable belief that someone is targetable would make him detainable-but only initially. With time,
the state must take steps to verify that detention is justified. The standard of
certainty effectively increases. 268
B. Developing and Enforcing Detention Law

1. Detaining Terrorists
Though all domains regulate pure security detention, decisionmakers
still debate when states may use it to incapacitate suspected terrorists. The
domain method frames the debate around the emergency and armed conflict
tests. The law enforcement domain discourages or prohibits such detention;
all other domains permit it.
That frame is at best distracting. The two tests are nebulous in situations involving terrorism, and in practice, many states respond to terrorist
violence by invoking an emergency. 269 Further, the choice of domain ultimately does not determine the outcome. Each domain potentially permits
pure security detention as a counterterrorism tool but leaves important
265. COMMENTARY GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 238, at 260.
266. See Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE W. REs.
J. INT'L L. 403, 434-35 (2009); Sassoli & Olson, supra note 3, at 622.
267. The conventional wisdom is that "it would be absurd to accept an interpretation of
IHL that results in a state's possessing the legal authority to kill actor X on purpose but lacking
the legal authority to detain actor X." Goodman, supra note 65, at 55. That wisdom is consistent with the liberty-security principle to the extent that it is applied to the initial decision
to detain. But it fails to account for the narrowed detention authority over time. For an argument similar to mine, see Waxman, supra note 161, at 1408-10.
268. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793-95 (2008) (requiring more robust
judicial review after initial period); CrimA 6659/06 A v. Israel 47 I.L.M. 768, 779-80 [2007)
(lsr.) (requiring clear and convincing evidence for long-term detention); Lind v. Russia, App.
No. 25664/05, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92, 105 (2007) ("[A]fter a certain lapse of time [reasonable
suspicion] no longer suffices.").
269. See, e.g., Demir v. Turkey, 1998-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2640 (discussing derogation);
Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 29, 50-51 (1993) (same); OHCHR
Report on States of Emergency, supra note 88 (listing declarations of emergency). Cf. Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objections Relating to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols Thereto, Note by the Secretary-General,
at 25, 27-28, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (Aug. 24, 1994) (reservations for counterterrorism
detention).
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questions unanswered. The combatant domain permits such detention if
terrorists are clearly identified. It does not define the authority to detain
when-as is often the case-someone's association with a terrorist group
security is ambiguous. 270 The civilian and emergency domains both permit
pure security detention if necessary, but neither specifies when detention
might be necessary. 271 Outside of Europe, even law enforcement HRL is
equivocal.272 The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognized in
2003 that terrorism sometimes justifies "exceptional measures that limit certain guarantees, including those relating to detention." 273 In 2009, the same
group asserted (without explanation) that security detention against suspected
terrorists "is inadmissible."274
For example, consider the systems of security detention in Malaysia
and the United Kingdom. Under Malaysian law, the government may detain people when necessary to prevent them "from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the security of Malaysia ... or to economic life thereof." 275
Security detention may last for renewable two-year periods with little process.276 According to one report, security detention has replaced the
criminal justice system in national security cases, broadly defined. 277 U.K.
law is more restrained. The government may detain terrorism suspects for
up to twenty-eight days without filing criminal charges. 278 It investigates
and, if possible, prosecutes all security detainees. 279 After two days, it entitles
them to judicial review. 280 Using the domain method, the situations in Malaysia and the United Kingdom are comparable. Both countries experience
episodic terrorism. If those conditions trigger an emergency, security detention is governed by an unspecified necessity standard. Absent an emergency,
such detention is suspect but, under universal HRL, still potentially lawful.

270. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 238, 252-256 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
273. Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention, Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Torture and Detention: Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, <JI 70,
U.N. Doc. FlCN.4/2004/3 (Dec. 15, 2003) (by Leila Zerroiigui).
274. Working Grp. on Arbitrary Detention, Promotion and Protection of All Human
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development: Rep. of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, <JI 54(b), U.N. Doc. NHRC/10/21
(Feb. 16, 2009) (by Manuela Carmena Castrillo).
275. Internal Security Act, 1960, c. 2, § 8(1) (Malay.).
276. See id.§§ 8(1), 8(7), 8B(l), 11-13.
277. Int'! Comm'n of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent
Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, at 107 (2009).
278. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (U.K.).
279. Id. c. 11, § 24; see also Government Reply to the Nineteenth Report from the Joint
Committee on Human Rights Session, Counterterrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 Days,
Intercept and Post-Charge Questioning, H.L. Paper 157, H.C. 394, at I (Sept. 2007)
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm72/7215/7215.pdf ("The purpose of the
extended detention time is to secure sufficient evidence for use in criminal proceedings.").
280. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 41 & sch. 8, part Ill.
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The functional approach better guides decisionmakers and equips them
to develop the law. The functional principles support a proposal on counterterrorism detention that I have advanced in other work. 281 The proposal's
basic parameters are as follows: First, as with targeting, membership in a
terrorism group may be evidence of a threat but does not alone justify security detention. 282 Second, the authority to detain should narrow with time.
Extended security detention should be permitted only when the detainee
poses a very serious threat (liberty-security principle) and the state has verified, using a fairly high standard of certainty and an independent review
process, that detention is justifiable (mistake principle). Third, states ordinarily should incapacitate terrorism suspects through the criminal process
(mitigation and mistake principles). 283 But postponing or forgoing the criminal process is sometimes reasonable. For example, states might use security
detention as the United Kingdom does, to facilitate prosecutions when the
ordinary criminal timeline is too onerous. 284 Alternatively, they might forgo
the criminal process when terrorism is recurrent and intransigent, or suspects take harbor in territories with weak or uncooperative law enforcement.
Under that framework, the Malaysian system is clearly more troubling
than the one in the United Kingdom. Malaysia permits longer detentions for
insufficiently serious conduct, circumvents the criminal justice system, and
lacks a meaningful process for lessening mistakes. Protesting the Malaysian
system on those grounds would more effectively pressure the government to
281. Hakimi, Detaining Terrorism Suspects, supra note 252, at 407-15.
282. The combatant, civilian, and law enforcement domains all treat associational status
as at least relevant to the threat inquiry. See International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombings arts. 2(3), 4, Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-6, at 5, 2149
U.N.T.S. 256, 286 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention] (requiring states to prosecute
accomplices and coconspirators); Geneva Convention III, supra note 15, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at
3320--22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40 (making membership determinative for combatants); COMMENTARY GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 238, at 258 (explaining that civilian
detentions may be warranted where a state "has serious and legitimate reason to think that
[civilians] are members of organizations whose object is to cause disturbances"). For a decision treating membership as relevant but not dispositive during an armed conflict, see CrimA
6659/06, Av. Israel 47 I.L.M. 768, 777-79 [2007] (lsr.). For a decision treating membership
as dispositive, see Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d I, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The problem with the
latter approach is evident in the U.S. case law: the criteria for membership are so amorphous
that identifying members is highly speculative and, at least in some cases, not especially relevant to containing a threat. See id. ("Whether a detainee would pose a threat to U.S. interests if
released is not at issue ...."); Robert M. Chesney, Who May be Held? Military Detention
Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2011) (reviewing U.S. practice).
283. See, e.g., Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 282, art. 8(1), 2149 U.N.T.S. at
288 (requiring states to prosecute people who participate in international terrorism); Brennan
Speech, supra note 49 (expressing "strong preference" for criminal detention); see also Robert
M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other
War, 2003-2010, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 549 (2011) (detailing U.S. transition in Iraq from system
dominated by security detention to one supporting criminal prosecutions).
284. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 23 (U.K.); see also CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE
arts. 63, 706-88 (Fr.); JACK STRAW, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, COUNTERTERRORISM LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 26 (2005)
(discussing practice in Spain).
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defend or alter its conduct than would invoking a contested domain or underspecified standard.
2. Detaining During Occupations or Territorial Administrations
The functional framework is also preferable for defining the authority to
detain during occupations and international territorial administrations
("ITAs"). By definition, an occupation exists-and IHL applies-when a
hostile state exercises authority over foreign territory. 285 That definition excludes ITAs like the ones in Kosovo and East Timor. ITAs are typically
established by intergovernmental organizations, not by states. 286 Moreover,
ITAs usually lack the hostility inherent in an occupation; they operate with
either the territorial state's consent or the UN Security Council's authorization.287 For those and other reasons, 288 decisionmakers generally do not treat
ITAs as occupations. 289 They instinctively apply law enforcement HRL. 290
Applying IHL to occupations and law enforcement HRL to ITAs suggests that each has disparate authorities. 291 Yet the two scenarios have much
in common. 292 Occupiers and ITA administrators both exercise governmental authority over foreign territory. Each might inherit a state apparatus that
functions well or requires substantial (re)building. And each might confront
a local population that is welcoming or violently resistant. No reason exists
for an occupier overseeing a functioning apparatus and peaceful population
285.

See Hague IV, supra note 22, annex art. 42, 36 Stat. at 2306.

286. IHL and HRL do not necessarily bind international organizations. See, e.g., Michael
Bothe, Peacekeeping and International Humanitarian Law: Friends or Foes?, 3 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 91 (1996); Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and United
Nations Military Operations, l Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (1998). Nevertheless, most
international organizations try to act consistently with those regimes. See, e.g., U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Secretary-General's Bulletin: Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).
287. See Tristan Ferraro, The Applicability of the Law of Occupation to Peace Forces, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE OPERATIONS 133, 136-38
(Gian Luca Beruto ed., 2008).
288. See Steven R. Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The Challenges of Convergence, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 695, 702-04 (2005) [hereinafter
Ratner, Challenges of Convergence] (discussing bureaucratic reasons); Sassoli, New Conflicts,
supra note 149, at 44 (explaining that applying IHL suggests that ITA forces are lawful targets).
289. See David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 852 & n.
48 (2003).
290. See, e.g., On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] Reg. No. 1999/1 'l[ 2 (1999); On the
Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor, United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor [UNTAET] Reg. No. 1999/1 <JI 2 ( 1999).
291. IHL permits occupying powers to use security detention when necessary. Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 60, art. 78, 6 U.S.T. at 3566-68, 75 U.N.T.S. at 336-38. Law enforcement HRL also uses a necessity standard, but its standard is usually interpreted more
narrowly. See supra notes 242-251 and accompanying text.
292.

Ratner, Challenges of Convergence, supra note 288.
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to have more detention authority than an ITA administrator confronting an
inoperative apparatus or violent resistance. Thus, some decisionmakers are
advancing hybrid outcomes for both entities. 293 The functional approach
enables decisionmakers to justify and refine those outcomes.
Moreover, using the functional principles might expose issues on which
different decisionmakers agree. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") was criticized in human rights circles for using
security detention during the ITA in Kosovo. 294 Critics claimed that NATO
violated law enforcement HRL. NATO quickly dismissed the criticism by
suggesting that HRL did not apply. 295 Yet despite that domain dispute,
NATO and its objectors appeared to agree that the authority to detain should
depend on the efficacy of the alternative-there, containing violence
through the local justice system. 296 The mitigation principle would have
highlighted that agreement.
The functional approach also would have held NATO accountable in a
way that invoking law enforcement HRL did not. Whereas NATO easily
dismissed HRL as inapplicable, using the functional approach would have
pressured NATO to justify its conduct on the merits. As the security situation in Kosovo improved and the local justice system became more reliable,

293. For evidence that ITA administrators exercise more detention authority than law
enforcement HRL usually permits, see OMBUDSPERSON INST. IN Kosovo, SPECIAL REP. No. 3,
THE CONFORMITY OF DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY UNDER 'EXECUTIVE ORDERS' WITH RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 'll'll 2, 5, 16 (2001), available at http://www.
ombudspersonkosovo.org/new/repository/docs/E40I0629a.pdf (Kosovo), and SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND
STATE-BUILDING 117-18 (2004) (East Timor). But cf Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No.
27021/08, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 789, 843-48 (2011) (applying law enforcement HRL to military
detention in Iraq). For evidence that occupiers may have less cletention authority than IHL
permits, see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Israeli Wall Case), Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 'l!'ll 105-113, 127-34 (July
9); EXPERT MEETING ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICTS AND SITUATIONS OF OcCUPATIONS 5--6, 23 (Univ. Ctr. for Int'! Humanitarian Law 2005).
294. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Kosovo (Serbia), 'l[ 17, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/UNK/C0/1 (Aug. 14, 2006); Comm'r
for Human Rights, Council of Eur., Kosovo: The Human Rights Situation and the Fate of Persons Displaced from Their Homes, 'lI'lI 76--82, CommDH(2002)1 l (Oct. 16, 2002) (by Alvaro
Gil-Robles) [hereinafter COE Report]; Amnesty Int'!, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo): International Officials Flout International Law, at 2, Al Index EUR 70/008/2002 (Aug.
31, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty 2002 Report].
295. See Amnesty Int'!, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo): The Legacy of Past Human
Rights Abuses, at 14, Al Index EUR/70/009/2004 (Apr. 2004) (quoting NATO as asserting that
the "authority to detain [was] a military decision, not ajudicial one").
296. Amnesty 2002 Report, supra note 294, at 18 (arguing that security detention was no
longer justifiable, given "the establishment of a functioning judicial system"); id. at 12 (acknowledging that NATO justified security detention "as a last resort," if civilian authorities
were unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the matter); COE Report, supra note 294,
'l['l[ 99-101 (acknowledging that security detention may be lawful if local justice system is
essentially unavailable).
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security detention would have been less defensible. 297 Moreover, NATO
would have had good reason to participate in that discourse. Using the
domain method, it could dismiss the human rights criticism but it still had
difficulty making the affirmative case that it acted lawfully. The law enforcement domain was inapt, but so were the others. The functional
approach would have empowered NATO to try to legitimize its conduct
and silence the critics.
CONCLUSION

This Article rejects the domain method for determining when states may
target or detain nonstate actors. The domain method presupposes that the
domains operate independently-that no overarching framework explains or
informs the law across domains. This Article argues, to the contrary, that all
targeting and detention law is and should be rooted in three core principles:
liberty-security, mitigation, and mistake. A functional approach using those
principles would help cure the practical problems of the domain method. It
would enable decisionmakers to develop the law incrementally. Using the
functional approach, they might converge on areas of agreement by crafting
novel outcomes and without risking a slippery slope. Moreover, the functional approach would better hold decisionmakers accountable. Decisions
would have to be justified on the merits, instead of by ipse dixit reference to
a contested domain or underspecified standard.
To be sure, the functional approach would not guarantee particular outcomes or even that outcomes would eventually be settled. Neither does the
domain method. The international system is decentralized and operates
mostly discursively, with coercive enforcement being relatively rare. As
such, legal positions that lack broad policy support are unlikely to be effective in practice. 298 Any scheme for assessing targeting and detention must
account for that reality. If nothing else, it must provide a common language
with which decisionmakers own up to their positions, debate their differences, find areas of agreement, and condemn those who stray from shared
expectations.
Though the functional approach is intended to assess the targeting and
detention of nonstate actors, it might benefit other areas of law as well. I
conclude by crystalizing four questions that have emerged from this study
and warrant further research. First, should decisionmakers use the functional
approach to assess the targeting and detention of state agents? As discussed,
the combatant domain carries certain benefits when applied to state
297. Cf Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The
United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East 1imor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 60 (2001) (explaining need to establish "a cohert;:nt judicial and legal system for an entire territory virtually
from scratch").
298. See W. Michael Reisman, On the Causes of Uncenainty and Volatility in International Law, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33, 37
(Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) ("[M]eaningful common interest is the critical
political component in the effectiveness of legal arrangements.").
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agents. 299 Nevertheless, its irrebuttable presumptions may no longer be justifiable, given developments in military technology and in how interstate wars
are fought. 300 Second, might this functional approach resolve current tensions between IHL and HRL on the one hand, and the jus ad helium on the
other hand? 301 Operations that are lawful under the jus ad helium may not
fall squarely in any IHL or HRL domain. The functional approach arguably
equips decisionmakers to protect the interests that underlie IHL and HRL,
without unduly restricting states' rights under the jus ad helium. Third,
would a functional approach be useful in assessing other liberty-restricting
measures? For example, HRL requires states to respect peoples' freedom of
expression. 302 That obligation might require something different in domestic
law enforcement settings than during extraterritorial missions or peacekeeping operations. Finally, should the domain method be discarded
altogether? IHL and HRL have been converging for decades, 303 and many
suggest that the norms on targeting and detention are the primary sticking
points between regimes. 304 With that tension addressed, to what extent is
the IHL-HRL distinction still relevant and justifiable?305

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

305.

See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 15-17, 126, 153-159 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50, 215.
See ICCPR, supra note 82, art. 19,999 U.N.T.S. at 178.
See Meron, supra note 18, at 243-47.
See, e.g., Sassoli & Olson, supra note 3, at 600-01.
For initial thoughts, see supra note 18.
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